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Dear client, This week, we are sending you an abbreviated Weekly Report as we co-authored a Special Report on Wednesday with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service. In our Special Report, available on our website, we argue that Italy's flirtation with leaving the euro area is rooted in its positive experience with devaluations in the 1990s. However, we note that this time is different and devaluing the euro through exit will not be a panacea, as financial market linkages would cause a deep domestic recession that could be brought forward by the mere reality of a referendum on the topic. As such, we think that Italy is unlikely to leave the Euro Area, but that it will remain a drag on the Eurozone - one that will force the European Central Bank to stay a bit more dovish than warranted by conditions in the broader Euro Area. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Feature Chart I-1The Dollar At A Critical Spot Since the end of last week, the dollar has staged a small rebound. This rebound was of the utmost importance as it materialized at an important level. Had DXY punched below the 96 level, the dollar could have sold off toward 93 in a matter of weeks. However, if the dollar can remain above 96, the greenback is likely to have formed a trough for the remainder of 2017 as it will rest above an important congestion zone that has been in place since early 2015 (Chart I-1). What are the odds of the greenback moving back to 93? We think that right now the balance of probability is in favor of a continued rebound. A call on DXY is first and foremost a call on the euro, as EUR/USD represents 60% of this index. We'll thus focus on the dynamics in this pair. Currently, nominal short rate differentials remain in the dollar's favor. As Chart I-2 illustrates, interbank rate spreads between the Euro Area and the U.S. are broadly supportive of the USD. Additionally, in both the late 1990s and in 2005-06, this spread had been much more negative than at present. BCA still expects the spread to grow more negative as the Federal Reserve continues on its intended policy path, while we also believe it will take a few more years before the ECB can begin lifting rates.1 Real rate differentials paint a similar picture. The euro's strength in the second quarter has emerged in spite of a move in real rate spreads in favor of the USD. As Chart I-3 shows, this divergence has mostly reflected dynamics at the short end of the yield curve, but over the past month and a half the real interest rate difference at the 10-year maturity has also diverged from the EUR/USD's path. Chart I-2EUR/USD Short Rate Differentials ##br##Can Grow Deeper Chart I-3EUR/USD Has Dissociated##br## From A Key Driver Technically, the dollar is beginning to look attractive against the euro as well. Our positioning indicator - based on sentiment, net speculative positions, and the euro's advanced/decline line - shows that investors are already positioned the most euro bullish since 2012 (Chart I-4). Our intermediate-term technical indicator is also at highly overbought levels, highlighting the euro's limited upside potential. Most importantly though, these moves have happened as the Euro Area economic surprise index massively beat the U.S. one (Chart I-4, bottom panel). This means that Europe's economic outperformance has been driving the euro's strength, unlike in 2015 when the surge in the European surprise index relative to the U.S. was reflective of the euro's 2014 collapse. This paints a picture where much good European news has been priced into EUR/USD during the recent rally. At current levels, the mean-reverting nature of the relative surprise index suggests that European surprises are unlikely to continue to beat U.S. ones by such a margin going forward. This means that the already overbought euro is likely to lose a key support. Finally, as we highlighted two weeks ago, global analysts have already ratcheted up their year-end estimates for EUR/USD (Chart I-5). Not only are their forecasts at levels that have in recent years been indicative of a peak, but the speed and magnitude of their adjustments has also been exceptional. This corroborates that the positive momentum in the Eurozone vis-à-vis the U.S. has already been internalized by market participants. If anything, this favorable relative economic momentum must only grow going forward for the euro to rally further. However, European LEIs have already rolled over relative to the U.S. as the latter looks set to exit its soft patch in the coming months (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Good News Already ##br##In The Euro Chart I-5Investors Have Already##br## Bought The Euro Chart I-6The Economic Tailwinds For The ##br##Euro Are Beginning To Fade Bottom Line: DXY has rebounded at a crucial level. If it can stay above 96, this would suggest that its correction is over. We are willing to make this bet as the euro - the key component of the DXY - has dissociated from rate differentials on strong optimism toward the economic outlook for Europe - at the exact time that investors have become more incredulous of the Fed's intentions. Due to these dynamics, EUR/USD is now massively overbought and at risk of a further pullback. Cutting Loose Short USD/JPY Last week, we closed our short USD/JPY position at a 4.2% gain. We did so because we see an increasingly less-supportive environment for the yen. To begin with, the U.S. Treasury notes' fair-value model used by our U.S. Bond Strategy service highlights that U.S. bond yields are currently quite expensive, and could be set to rise anew (Chart I-7). Because JGBs possess a very low beta relative to U.S. yields, an environment where global rates rise tends to be associated with rate differentials moving in favor of USD/JPY, often prompting a rally in the latter. Also, the Bank of Japan is keenly aware that it will be very difficult to achieve its 2% inflation target. The yen's recent strength has exerted a significant tightening in Japanese financial conditions that will drag down inflation (Chart I-8). Hence, the BoJ will continue to be among the most dovish central banks in the world. Additionally, while Japanese industrial production has been strong, it looks set to soften in the coming months, which will give further reason to the BoJ to talk down the yen: Japanese industrial production is very much a function of financial conditions. We are entering a window where the recent tightening in Japanese financial conditions should begin to bite industrial production. The growth rate of the Japanese shipments-to-inventories ratio has rolled over, historically a precursor of a slowdown in industrial production (Chart I-9). Chart I-7T-Notes Are Expensive Chart I-8Japanese FCI Points To Lower Inflation Chart I-9Japanese IP Will Turn Finally, the annual growth rate of Japan's industrial production is heavily influenced by China's economic dynamics, as EM represents 43% of Japanese exports. Two months ago, the Keqiang index - a barometer of strength for the Chinese economy based on credit growth, railway freight volumes, and electricity production - hit its highest level since June 2010, levels only recorded in early 2007, early 2005, and early 2004. Even though we do not anticipate it to crater, we do expect its recent rollover to deepen further in response to the recent wave of policy tightening in China. This should result in some weakness for Japan's industrial production. In practice there is little additional actions the BoJ can implement to ease policy further. However, because investors are currently so negative on the prospects for further Fed rate increases, with only 40 basis points priced in over the next 24 months, a re-assurance by the BoJ that easy policy is here to stay could put upward pressure on USD/JPY. While we remain worried about EM assets, we think that shorting the AUD or the NZD against the yen represents better portfolio protection than shorting USD/JPY. Bottom Line: USD/JPY has a generous amount of upside from here. Investors are too pessimistic regarding the Fed's ability to increase rates over the next 24 months. Meanwhile, the recent tightening in Japanese financial conditions is a headache for the BoJ, as it points to weaker inflation and a slowdown in industrial production. Hence, we expect the BoJ will try to talk down the yen over the coming months. EUR/NOK At An Interesting Spot Chart I-10If Brent Doesn't Fall Below,##br## EUR/NOK Is A Short The price action in EUR/NOK caught our eye this week. EUR/NOK is at a critical level and has rallied as investor optimism toward the Euro Area economy continues to grow. Meanwhile, oil prices have collapsed to US$45/bbl. Since Norway is an economy heavily geared to oil-price gyrations, this bifurcation created an ideal combination to generate a EUR/NOK rally. However, by discounting these developments, EUR/NOK has now entered massively overbought territory. Additionally, as Chart I-10 illustrates, the cross has only traded at higher levels at the depth of the financial crisis in the first quarter of 2009 and the early days of 2016. In both instances, Brent was trading below US$40/bbl. A selling opportunity could soon emerge. Our Commodity And Energy Strategy service continues to expect a deepening of the adjustment in global oil inventories as the OPEC 2.0 deal remains in vigor and compliance stays in place.2 This means a move below US$40/bbl for Brent is very unlikely, and the upside in EUR/NOK is extremely limited. While in the coming weeks a move in Brent to between US$44/bbl and US$42/bbl could happen, we think this limited downside points to an attractive risk-reward ratio to shorting this cross. We are currently long CAD/NOK and short EUR/CAD, with the latter having greater potential downside than EUR/NOK. However, due to Canada's deep integration with the U.S. economy, the EUR/CAD trade is often affected by dynamics in the U.S. dollar. Shorting EUR/NOK is thus a cleaner play on oil and removes much of the risk associated with the greenback's fluctuations. Finally, yesterday, the Norges Bank policy release displayed less dovish tone than anticipated by the market. This kind of surprise would create an additional support to being short EUR/NOK. Bottom Line: EUR/NOK looks set to weaken. Over the past 10 years, it has only traded above current levels when Brent prices were below US$40/bbl. Based on our commodity team's analysis, such a move is very unlikely. Thus, any short-term weakness in oil prices should be used to sell EUR/NOK. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Central Banks Are Sticking To Their Guns", dated June 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Time For "Whatever It Takes" In Oil?", dated June 2, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The divergence between global bond yields and equity prices is not as puzzling as it may first appear. Thus far, lower inflation has dampened the need for central banks to tighten monetary policy. This has caused bond yields to fall, lifting stocks in the process. Looking out, the combination of faster growth and dwindling spare capacity will cause inflation to rise. This is particularly the case for the U.S., where the economy has already reached full employment. The "blow-off" phase for the U.S. economy is likely to last until mid-2018. The dollar and Treasury yields will move higher over this period. The euro and the yen will suffer the most against a resurgent greenback, the pound less so. China's economy will remain resilient, helping to boost commodity prices. This will support the Canadian and Aussie dollars. Stronger global growth will provide a tailwind to emerging markets. However, at this point, most of the good news is already reflected in EM asset valuations. Feature Stocks And Bonds: A Curious Divergence Chart 1Global Growth: Increasing Optimism One could be forgiven for thinking that equity and bond investors are living on different planets. Global bond yields have been trending lower thus far this year, while stocks have been setting new highs. Are bonds signaling an imminent slowdown which equity investors are willfully ignoring? Not necessarily. Almost all of the decline in bond yields has been due to falling inflation expectations. Real yields have remained reasonably steady, suggesting that growth worries are not foremost on investors' minds. The fact that consensus global growth estimates for 2017 and 2018 have continued to grind higher is consistent with this observation (Chart 1). A quiescent inflation picture has given investors more confidence that the Fed will not need to raise rates aggressively. This has pushed down bond yields, weakened the dollar, and fueled the rally in stock prices. The decline in headline inflation, in turn, has been largely driven by lower commodity prices. In the U.S., several one-off factors - including Verizon's decision to move to unlimited data plans, a temporary lull in health care inflation, and a drop in airline fares - have helped keep core inflation in check. The U.S. Economy: It Gets Better Before It Gets Worse Looking out, global growth is likely to remain firm. This should ultimately translate into higher inflation, particularly in the U.S., where the economy has already achieved full employment. Granted, as we discussed last week,1 the U.S. business cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. However, history suggests that the transition between boom and bust is often accompanied by a revelry of sorts where things get better before they get worse. Call it a "blow-off" phase for the business cycle. The example of the late 1990s - the last time the U.S. unemployment rate fell below NAIRU for an extended period of time - comes to mind. Chart 2 shows that final domestic demand accelerated to 8.3% in nominal terms in Q1 of 2000. Personal consumption growth surged, reaching 8.4% in nominal terms and 5.7% in real terms. Obviously, there are many differences between now and then. However, there is at least one critical similarity: The unemployment rate stood at 4.3% in January 1999. This is exactly where it stands today. And if it keeps falling at its current pace, the unemployment rate will dip below its 2000 low of 3.8% by next summer. As was the case in the past, an overheated labor market will lead to faster wage growth. In the U.S., underlying wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% at present (Chart 3). Chart 2The Late 1990s: An End-Of-Cycle Blow-Off Chart 3Stronger Labor Market Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Granted, this is still well below the levels seen in 2000 and 2007. However, productivity growth has crumbled over the past decade while long-term inflation expectations have dipped. Real unit labor costs - a measure of compensation which adjusts for shifts in productivity growth and inflation - are rising at a faster rate than in 2007 and close to the pace recorded in 2000 (Chart 4). In fact, real wage growth in the U.S. has eclipsed business productivity growth for three straight years (Chart 5). As a result, labor's share of national income is now increasing. Chart 4Real Unit Labor Cost Growth: Back To Its 2000 Peak Chart 5Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity What happens to aggregate demand when the share of income going to workers rises? The answer is that at least initially, demand goes up. Companies typically spend less of every marginal dollar of income than workers. This is especially the case in today's environment where the distribution of corporate profits has become increasingly tilted towards a few winner-take-all firms which, for the most part, are already flush with cash (Chart 6). Thus, a shift of income towards workers tends to boost overall spending. In addition, an overheated labor market typically generates the biggest gains for workers at the bottom of the income distribution. Wages for U.S. workers without a college degree have been rising more quickly than those with a university education for the past few years (Chart 7). Such workers often live paycheck-to-paycheck and, hence, have a high marginal propensity to consume. Chart 6A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart 7Tighter Labor Market Boosting Wages Of Less Educated Workers Let's Get This Party Started The discussion above suggests that U.S. aggregate demand could accelerate over the next few quarters. There is some evidence that this is already happening (Chart 8). Despite a moderation in auto purchases, real PCE growth is still tracking at 3.2% in the second quarter according to the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model. And with the personal saving rate still stuck at an elevated 5.3%, there is scope for consumer spending to grow at a faster rate than disposable income. Chart 9 shows that the current saving rate is well above the level one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income. Chart 8Solid Near-Term Outlook For U.S. Consumers Financial conditions have eased over the past six months thanks to lower Treasury yields, narrower credit spreads, a weaker dollar, and higher equity prices (Chart 10). Historically, an easing in financial conditions has foreshadowed faster growth (Chart 11). This could make the coming blow-off phase even more explosive than in past business cycles. Some commentators have noted that while financial conditions have eased, bank lending has slowed significantly. If true, this would imply that easier financial conditions are not boosting credit growth in the way one might expect. The problem with this argument is that it takes a far too limited view of the U.S. financial system. Although bank lending to companies has indeed slowed, bond issuance has soared. In fact, total nonfinancial corporate debt rose by $212 billion in the first quarter according to the Fed's Financial Accounts database, the largest increase in history (Chart 12). Chart 10Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Chart 11...Which Will Support Growth Chart 12Nonfinancial Corporate Debt Surged In Q1 All Good Things Must Come To An End Unfortunately, the burst of demand that often occurs in the late stages of business cycle expansions contains the seeds of its own demise. Initially, when consumer spending accelerates, firms tend to react by expanding capacity. This translates into higher investment spending. However, as labor's share of income keeps rising, an increasing number of firms start incurring outright losses. This causes them to dismiss workers and cut back on investment spending. Such a souring in corporate animal spirits is not an immediate risk for the U.S. economy. Hiring intentions remain solid and businesses are still signaling that they expect to increase capital spending over the coming months (Chart 13). Profit margins are also quite high by historic standards, which gives firms greater room for maneuver. This will change over time, however. Margins are already falling in the national accounts data (Chart 14). History suggests that S&P 500 margins will follow suit. This raises the risk that capex and hiring will start to slow late next year, potentially sowing the seeds for a recession in 2019. We remain overweight global equities on a cyclical 12-month horizon, but will be looking to significantly pare back exposure next summer. Chart 13Corporate America Feeling Great Again Chart 14Economy-Wide Margins Have Slipped The Dollar Bull Market Is Not Over Yet Chart 15Historically, A Rising Labor Share Has Pushed Up The Dollar Until U.S. growth does decelerate, the path of least resistance for bond yields and the dollar will be to the upside. Chart 15 shows the strikingly close correlation between labor's share of income and the value of the trade-weighted dollar. As noted above, the initial effect of accelerating wage growth is to put more money into workers' pockets. This results in higher aggregate demand and, against a backdrop of low spare capacity, rising inflation. Historically, such an outcome has prompted the Fed to expedite the pace of rate hikes, leading to a stronger dollar. This time is unlikely to be any different. The market is currently pricing in only 21 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. This seems far too low to us. Other things equal, a stronger dollar implies a weaker euro and yen. Improved export competitiveness will lead to better growth prospects and higher inflation expectations in the euro area and Japan. Unless the ECB and the BoJ respond by tightening monetary policy, short-term real rates will fall. This, in turn, could put further downward pressure on the euro and the yen. The ECB And The BoJ Will Not Follow The Fed's Lead Many commentators have argued that better growth prospects will cause the ECB and the BoJ to follow in the Fed's footsteps and take away the punch bowl. We doubt it. Labor market slack is still considerably higher in the euro area than was the case in 2008. Outside of Germany, the level of unemployment and underemployment in the euro area is about seven points higher than it was before the Great Recession (Chart 16). If anything, the market has priced in too much tightening from the ECB. Our months-to-hike measure has plummeted from a high of 65 months in July 2016 to 28 months at present (Chart 17). Investors now expect real rates in the U.S. to be only 23 basis points higher than in the euro area in five years' time. This is well below the 76 basis-point gap in the equilibrium rate between the two regions that Holston, Laubach, and Williams estimate (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Is Still High Outside Of Germany Chart 17ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tightening Chart 18The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area As for Japan, while it is true that the unemployment rate has fallen to 2.8% - a 22-year low - this understates the true amount of slack in the economy. Output-per-hour in Japan remains 35% below U.S. levels. A key reason for this is that many Japanese companies continue to pad their payrolls with excess labor. This is particularly true in the service sector, which remains largely insulated from foreign competition. In any case, with both actual inflation and inflation expectations in Japan nowhere close to the BoJ's target, this is hardly the time to be worried about an overheated economy. And even if the Japanese authorities were inclined to slow growth, it would be fiscal policy rather than monetary policy that they would tighten first. After all, they have been keen to raise the sales tax for several years now. The Pound Will Rebound Against The Euro, But Weaken Further Against The Dollar Chart 19Pound: Unloved And Underappreciated While we continue to maintain a strong conviction view that the euro and yen will weaken against the dollar, we are more circumspect about other currencies. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney played down speculation this week that the BoE would raise rates later this year, noting in his annual speech at London's Mansion House that "now is not yet the time to begin that adjustment." U.K. growth has been the weakest in the G7 so far in 2017, partly because of growing angst over the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. Nevertheless, U.K. inflation remains elevated and fiscal policy is likely to be eased in the November budget, as Chancellor Hammond confirmed in a BBC interview on Sunday. Sterling is already quite cheap based on our metrics (Chart 19). Our best bet is that the pound will weaken against the dollar over the next 12 months but strengthen against the euro and the yen. We are currently long GBP/JPY. The trade has gained 7.2% since we initiated it in August 2016. CAD Has Upside We went long CAD/EUR in May. Despite the downdraft in oil prices, the trade has managed to gain 2.6% thus far. We are optimistic on the Canadian dollar over the coming months. Our energy strategists remain convinced that crude prices are heading higher. They expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. Consequently, oil inventories should fall over the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 20). The Bank of Canada has also turned more hawkish. Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins suggested last week that interest rates are likely to rise later this year. The market is now pricing in a 84% chance of a rate hike in 2017, up from only 18% earlier this month. The Canadian economy continues to perform well (Chart 21). Retail sales are growing briskly, the unemployment rate is close to its lowest level in 40 years, and goods exports are recovering thanks to a weak loonie and stronger growth south of the border. While the bubbly housing market remains a source of concern, this is as much a reason to raise interest rates - to prevent further overheating - as to cut them. Chart 20Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead To Higher Crude Prices Chart 21Canadian Economy: Chugging Along China Will Drive The Aussie Dollar And EM Assets After a very strong start to the year, Chinese growth has slipped a notch. Housing starts slowed in May, as did gains in property prices. M2 growth decelerated to 9.6% from a year earlier, the first time broad money growth has fallen into the single-digit range since the government began publishing such statistics in 1986. Still, the economy is far from falling off a cliff, as evidenced by the fact that the IMF upgraded its full-year 2017 GDP growth forecast from 6.6% to 6.7% last week. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production remain upbeat. Export growth is accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global growth. The PBoC's trade-weighted RMB basket has fallen by over 8% since it was introduced in December 2015. Retail sales continue to expand at a healthy clip. The percentage of households that intend to buy a new home has also surged to record-high levels. This should limit the fallout from the government's efforts to cool the housing market. The rebound in exports and industrial output is helping to lift producer prices. Higher selling prices, in turn, are fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 22). A better profit picture should support business capital spending in the coming months. The government also remains cognizant of the risks of tightening policy too aggressively, especially with the National Party Congress slated for this autumn. The PBoC injected 250 billion yuan into the financial system last Friday. This was the single biggest one-day intervention since January, when demand for cash was running high in the lead up to the Chinese New Year celebrations. Fiscal policy has also been eased (Chart 23). So far, the "regulatory windstorm" of measures designed to clamp down on financial speculation has largely bypassed the real economy. Medium and long-term lending to nonfinancial corporations - a key driver of private-sector capital spending - has actually accelerated over the past eight months (Chart 24). Chart 22China: Higher Selling Prices Fuelling A Rebound In Profits Chart 23Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend Chart 24China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating The key takeaway for investors is that Chinese growth is likely to slow over the next few quarters, but not by much. Considering that fund managers surveyed by BofA Merrill Lynch in June cited fears of a hard landing in China as the biggest tail risk facing financial markets for the second month in a row, the bar for positive surprises out of China is comfortably low. If China can clear this bar, as we expect it will, it will be good news for the Aussie dollar and other commodity plays. Strong Chinese growth should provide a tailwind for EM assets. However, EM stocks and currencies have already had a major run, which limits further upside. The fact that serial-defaulter Argentina could issue a 100-year bond this week in an offering that was three times oversubscribed is a testament to that. The fundamental problems plaguing many emerging markets - high debt levels, poor governance, and lackluster productivity growth - remain largely unaddressed. Until they are, the long-term outlook for EM assets will continue to be challenging. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession," dated June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
This week's housing data has told a story of increased activity in existing homes and wider financing availability; both are at their highest levels since emerging from the financial crisis (second panel). Importantly, mortgage refinancing applications reached their highest level since late last year, spurred by the decline in mortgage rates and rising house prices. This is a recipe for booming business at the country's home improvement retailers, which stands in sharp contrast to the rest of the retail industry's blues. A better retail environment has already shown up in producer price indexes for household furniture and durable goods appliances (third panel), indicating better profitability to come. Relative valuations have yet to catch up to the improved outlook (fourth panel), and the index has recently caught a small downdraft, creating a solid buying opportunity. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW.
Highlights For the time being, our cyclical stance is to underweight the globally-sensitive Energy, Materials and Banks sectors versus Healthcare - in both the equity and credit asset-class. Combined with our expectation of a weakening pound/euro, this necessarily means the following European equity market allocation: Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. Underweight: Italy, Spain, and Norway. We anticipate shifting to a more cyclical sector (and country) allocation by the late summer, especially on dips. Feature It is worth reminding readers that picking mainstream equity markets1 is overwhelmingly about the industry sectors and dominant stocks that you are buying, wittingly or unwittingly. Picking equity markets is seldom about the prospects of the underlying domestic economies or head-to-head valuations.2 Chart of the WeekGlobal Energy Has Just Tracked The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse (Down) The usual top-down approach to picking stock markets ignores two dominant features of these markets. First, they have huge variations in their sector exposures. Second, large industry sector groups like Energy, Banks, Healthcare and Technology tend to move en masse under the influence of global or regional rather than domestic drivers. The combination of these two features means that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) impact swamps the effect that comes from the domestic economy. Right now, by far the most important consideration for country pickers is the relative outlook for the globally-sensitive Energy and Banks sectors versus the more defensive Healthcare. As an example, consider the choice between Spain and Switzerland. Spain's IBEX is at the mercy of its huge weighting to Banks, dominated by Santander and BBVA; while Switzerland's SMI is at the mercy of its similarly dominant weighting in the Healthcare sector, via Novartis and Roche. Box I-1 - Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks (Chart 2). France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials (Chart 3). Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks (Chart 4). Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks (Chart 5). Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks (Chart 6). Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy (Chart 7). And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound (Chart 8). Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy (Chart 9). Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials (Chart 10). Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials (Chart 11). Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy (Chart 12). The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks (Chart 13). It follows that if Banks underperform Healthcare, it is highly likely that Spain's IBEX will underperform Switzerland's SMI, irrespective of the performances of the Spanish and Swiss domestic economies. For long-term investors, the large skews in sector exposure also mean that a head-to-head comparison of country valuations can be very misleading. At first glance, Spain, trading on a forward price to earnings (PE) multiple of 15.5, appears 15% cheaper than Switzerland, trading on a multiple of over 18. But this head-to-head difference just reflects the impact of forward PEs of Banks at 11 and Healthcare at 18. The Bank sector's lower multiple does not necessarily make it better value than Healthcare. Unlike two developed economies - whose long-term growth prospects tend to be broadly similar - two industry sectors could end up experiencing very different structural growth outcomes. Which would justify very different multiples. Despite its low multiple, a structural underweight to Banks might nonetheless be a good strategy if the sector's structural growth outlook is poor. In such a case, the low multiple is potentially a value trap. Picking Stock Markets The Right Way To reiterate, the decision to overweight or underweight a mainstream equity index should not be based on your view of the country's underlying economy - unless, of course, the country is the potential source of a major tail-risk event. Instead, the decision should be based on your over-arching sector view, combined with the country's skews to specific dominant stocks and sectors (Box I-1). Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5, Chart I-6, Chart I-7, Chart I-8, Chart I-9, Chart I-10, Chart I-11, Chart I-12 and Chart I-13 should leave readers in absolutely no doubt. A market's dominant sector skew is by far the most important determinant of its relative performance. Chart I-2Germany (DAX) Is Overweight Chemicals,##br## Underweight Banks Chart I-3France (CAC) Is Underweight Banks##br## And Basic Materials Chart I-4Italy (MIB) Is Overweight Banks Chart I-5Spain (IBEX) Is Overweight Banks Chart I-6Netherlands (AEX) Is Overweight Technology,##br## Underweight Banks Chart I-7Ireland (ISEQ) Is Overweight Airlines (Ryanair) ##br##Which Is, In Effect, Underweight Energy Chart I-8The U.K. (FTSE100) Is Effectively ##br##Underweight The Pound Chart I-9Switzerland (SMI) Is Overweight Healthcare, ##br##Underweight Energy Chart I-10Sweden (OMX) Is ##br##Overweight Industrials Chart I-11Denmark (OMX20) Is Overweight ##br##Healthcare And Industrials Chart I-12Norway (OBX) Is ##br##Overweight Energy Chart I-13The U.S. (S&P500) Is Overweight Technology, ##br##Underweight Banks Which brings us to the key consideration for country allocation right now: how to allocate to the sectors that feature most often in the skews: Energy and Banks versus Healthcare. For Energy relative performance, note the very strong recent connection with the global 6-month credit impulse. The downswing in the impulse - heralding a very clear growth pause - lines up with the setback in energy and resource prices and the underperformance of these globally-sensitive equity sectors (Chart of the Week and Chart I-14). Meanwhile, in the most recent mini-cycle, Banks' relative performance is tracking the bond yield almost tick for tick (Chart I-15). There are two reasons. For banks, lower bond yields presage both slimmer net interest margins and weaker economic growth. Chart I-14Commodity Price Inflation Is Just Tracking ##br##The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Chart I-15Financials Are Just Tracking ##br##The Bond Yield So for both Energy and Banks relative performance the overriding question is: when will this mini-downswing end? To answer this question, we note that we are 4-5 months into the global mini-downswing, whose average duration tends to be around 8-9 months. On this basis, now is a little too early to switch to an aggressively pro-cyclical sector allocation. But we would look for potential opportunities by the late summer, especially on sharp dips. Hence, for the time being our cyclical stance is to underweight the globally-sensitive Energy (and Materials) and Banks versus Healthcare. Combined with our expectation of a weakening pound/euro, this necessarily means the following European country allocation: Overweight: France,3 Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. Underweight: Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Norway. Clearly, if you have a different cyclical and over-arching sector view, you will arrive at a different country allocation. That's fine. The important point is that the stock and sector skew approach is the right way to pick between mainstream equity indexes. Financials Drive The European Credit Market Finally, an over-arching sector view is also highly relevant for the European corporate credit market. In the euro area, the credit market is heavily skewed towards bank and other financial sector bonds, which account for almost half of euro area corporate bonds by value. By comparison, the U.S. credit market is not so skewed to one dominant sector. Hence, the outlook for the European credit asset-class hinges on the prospects for one sector: Financials (Chart 16). With the European high yield credit spread already close to a 20-year low, we would again wait for a better opportunity before adding aggressively to the European credit asset-class. Chart I-16Mirror Image: European High Yield Credit Spread And Bank Equity Prices Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In the developed world. 2 Please also see the three European Investment Strategy Special Reports 'Picking 5 European Countries The Right Way' November 13, 2014, 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 2' March 26, 2015 and 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 3' November 12, 2015. 3 But expect a small near-term countertrend underperformance in the CAC40. See page 11. Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. Last week's trade, long nickel / short palladium has made an encouraging countertrend move at the classic limit of a trend. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-17 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
The Empire State Manufacturing and Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook surveys typically move in lockstep and their message last week was united; the domestic outlook for manufacturing is exceptionally strong. Both surveys have historically been reliable indicators for industrial machinery orders, which have only recently turned positive (second panel). A softer U.S. dollar too should lift demand with roughly 40% of revenues derived internationally. Capacity utilization should not present a roadblock to much higher production, as it remains below normal for this stage in the order cycle (third panel). As utilization rates firm, pricing power should gain strength. Despite the improving outlook, valuations have been stuck in neutral, as earnings estimates are rising faster than relative share prices. Importantly, the relative forward P/E remains well below previous bull market peaks (fourth panel). Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INDM - ITW, IR, SWK, PH, FTV, DOV, PNR, XYL, SNA, FLS.
Highlights Odds the leaders of the OPEC 2.0 petro-states will be forced to back up last month's "whatever it takes" declaration - perhaps deepening and extending the 1.8mm b/d production cuts agreed at the end of last year - are not yet overwhelming. All the same, they will continue to increase, if markets do not see sustained draws in visible storage. Our updated supply-demand balances indicate global crude inventories will continue to draw, and that these draws will accelerate. This will keep global storage levels on track to normalize later this year or in 1Q18. We continue to expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl by December, with WTI ~ $2/bbl under that. Energy: Overweight. Our low-risk call spread initiated last week - long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls - is down 18.9%, following continued selling. We are adding to the position with the same Dec/17 strikes in Brent at tonight's close. These are strategic positions. Base Metals: Neutral. SHFE copper inventories fell on the back of increased demand for collateral to support financing deals in China. Tightening credit conditions are beginning to bite as the government pushes deleveraging policies, according to Metal Bulletin. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold, despite the hawkish rhetoric being thrown around by Fed officials, particularly William Dudley, head of the NY Fed. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 1.1% since it was put on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chicago and KC winter wheat remain bid, as concerns over drought-induced damage to the crop continue to weigh on markets. Feature Chart of the WeekUpdated Balances Leave Us Bullish Crude Insomuch as such things can ever be "official," crude oil officially entered a bear market - down 20% or more from recent highs - with the unexpected arrival of WTI futures below the lower end of our long-time $45-to-$65/bbl trading range this week.1 The proximate causes of this turn of events are persistently sticky inventory levels - most visible in the high-frequency data from the U.S. - and growing fears increasing Libyan and U.S. shale-oil production will undermine OPEC 2.0's 1.8mm b/d production cuts. We are hard-pressed to see the case for such fears, even though the market is consistently trading in a manner that is more aligned with supply cuts being far less than advertised by OPEC 2.0, or demand slowing considerably more than any agency or data service has yet picked up on. We will never be able to confirm sovereign hedging - e.g., Mexico or Iraq hedging oil-production revenues - until after the fact. However, this cannot be dismissed out of hand. Based on our latest supply-demand analysis, OPEC 2.0 - the coalition lead by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will have removed some 1.4mm b/d of production on average from the market between January 2017 and end-March 2018 vs. peak production in November of last year (Chart of the Week). This will be diluted somewhat by the Libyan and U.S. production gains, but this increased production will not be sufficient to counter the OPEC 2.0 cuts entirely. Global Oil Supply Contracting Sharply Chart 2OECD Storage Draws On Track Against peak production in November 2016, we see just over 1.2mm b/d of crude oil production being cut by OPEC between January and end-March-2018.2 Throw in another 200 - 300k b/d or so from the non-OPEC members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition - mostly Russia - and we get to 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of production taken off the market in the Jan/17 - Mar/18, interval in our modeling. This will leave the highly visible OECD storage levels being targeted by OPEC 2.0 at ~ 2.70 billion barrels by the end of the year, or some time close to the start of next year (Chart 2). In our modeling, we do not agree with the implied 1.9mm b/d of production cuts that follow from the reported OPEC 2.0 compliance statistics in the press. These reports indicate OPEC 2.0 coalition members are at 106% compliance. This is remarkably high, even if reports of this compliance rely on anonymous sources speaking to reporters following the coalition's technical committee meeting in Vienna earlier this week.3 If the production discipline attested to is true, we will raise our estimate of how quickly inventories will draw this year, and lower our expected global inventory levels for the end of March 2018. As for U.S. crude production, while we do have Dec/17 production 1.1mm b/d over Dec/16, we expect America's contribution to yoy global production growth to be only ~ 340k b/d on average over the course of 2017. The U.S. gains will be driven by shale-oil production, which we expect to grow ~ 410k b/d to 5.2mm b/d this year (Chart 3). Libya's production recently surged to 900k b/d, according to press reports, but, so far this year, it is averaging just under 700k b/d (Chart 4). This is slightly higher than the level we've been modeling in our balances for this year. The 300k b/d yoy increase in Libya's production is impressive, but it does not overwhelm OPEC 2.0's cuts. Even if Libyan production were to average 1mm b/d in 2H17, its net contribution to global production this year would be ~ 840k b/d, an increase of ~ 400k b/d over 2016's levels. We also note that as production and revenue increase the likelihood of renewed violence in Libya also increases.4 Chart 3U.S. Shale-Oil##BR##Growth Could Slow Chart 4Libya's Recover Is Impressive,##BR##But It Won't Reverse OPEC 2.0's Cuts Between them, combined growth in U.S. and Libyan production looks like it will be a touch under 650k b/d yoy (on average). Meanwhile, OPEC 2.0's production cuts - assessed against peak output for 2016 - are on track to exceed targets set at the outset of the agreement last December. Net, on a yoy basis, we expect to register inventory draws of close to 900k b/d this year. This should lead to cumulative draws in global storage levels of at least 400mm bbls by end-March. Demand Remains Strong The EIA revised its liquids demand estimates in its most recent Short-term Energy Outlook (STEO), and now has 2015 global consumption up 300k b/d from previous estimates at 95.4mm b/d, and 2016 consumption up 180k b/d at 96.9mm b/d. Our expected growth in global demand for this year and next is in line with the EIA's average estimate of ~ 1.6mm b/d, which will put 2017 demand at 98.5mm b/d and 2018 at 100.1mm b/d, respectively. Growth this year and next is expected to be slightly higher than last year's level (Chart 5). Once again, we expect EM demand - proxied by non-OECD liquids consumption - to lead global growth this year and next. Concern over apparent slowing in U.S. refined-product demand - particularly gasoline - is, we believe, overdone. Growth this year is being compared to stellar rates last year (Chart 6), which still leaves the level of demand above 20mm b/d. Growth in gasoline demand specifically also has slowed, but, again, this is occurring in a market where the level of demand remains high, pushing toward 10mm b/d, which is a mere 2.5% below record demand set in August of last year (Chart 7). Chart 5Expect Global Demand##BR##To Remain Stout Chart 6The Level Of U.S. Product##BR##Demand Remains High Chart 7U.S. Gasoline Demand##BR##Also Remains Stout 2018 Getting Foggy Uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the oil market next year is growing. The EIA believes markets will tighten in 3Q17, but then get progressively looser going into 2018, apparently disregarding OPEC 2.0's efforts to date, and the high likelihood - in our view - that the coalition will maintain production discipline for the most part (Chart 8). Combined with the robust demand growth BCA and the EIA expect, we get a fairly balanced market next year (Chart of the Week). U.S. shale-oil production, once again, will dictate just how tight markets become next year. Presently, we have average 2018 U.S. shale production in the Big 4 basins - Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and the Permian - coming in more than 1mm b/d over 2017 levels. However, the recent sell-off that took WTI into bear-market territory this week could have a profound effect on shale-drilling activity next year, if it persists. Recent econometric work we've done confirms rig counts in the Big 4 plays are highly sensitive to WTI price. A prolonged stretch below $45/bbl could reduce rig counts by as much as 40% next year, especially if private-equity-backed companies cut spending. With hedging levels down, this is not a trivial concern (Chart 9).5 If prices stay depressed for any length of time for whatever reason - an outcome we do not expect - U.S. shale drilling activity could once again plummet. Chart 8EIA Fades OPEC 2.0's Resolve,##BR##BCA Does Not Chart 9Weak Prices Could##BR##Reduce Shale Rig Counts In addition, low prices also increase fiscal stress levels in petro-state revenues. This is of particular concern for KSA and Russia. The former is almost wholly dependent on oil revenues to fund its budgets, and will be looking to IPO its state-owned oil company, Aramco, next year. The latter is heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues, and will be holding an election in mid-March, just ahead of the expiry of the OPEC 2.0 production-cut extensions. The benchmark Russian crude, Urals, trades ~ $1.00 to $1.25/bbl under Brent, and any prolonged excursion into the low-$40s by Brent would stress the state's revenues. This is not our base case, but it is worthwhile considering. This mutual dependence on oil prices to support their respective economies is what compels strong compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production deal. Bottom Line: Our updated balances modeling continues to support our view global oil storage will draw, with OECD inventories likely falling below five-year average levels by year-end or early next year. Self-reported compliance with OPEC 2.0's production-cutting agreement exceeds 100%, implying the coalition is tracking to a 1.9mm b/d reduction in crude-oil output at present. On the demand side, even after upward revisions to 2015 and 2016 demand figures by the U.S. EIA, liquids consumption still is expected to grow on average ~ 1.6mm b/d this year and next. Cuts in production by OPEC 2.0 this year are more than sufficient to offset increases in Libyan and U.S. production, leaving overall production below consumption globally by close to 900k b/d, which will ensure inventories draw. For next year, after storage draws have abated, we expect supply and demand to be roughly balanced. We continue to expect Brent prices to trade to $60/bbl by year-end, and, on that basis, are recommending a long Dec/17 $50/bbl Brent call vs. short a Dec/17 $55/bbl Brent call. Longer term, our central tendency for price remains $55/bbl, with a range of $45 to $65/bbl prevailing most of the time. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 We are using the front-line WTI futures contract, which hit its recent high on Feb. 23 at $54.45/bbl (last price) and traded down to $43.23/bbl on June 20, registering a drop of 20.6%. First-line Brent has yet to fall more than 20% from its recent high of $57.10/bbl on Jan. 6 to $46.02/bbl on June 20 (a 19.4% drop). 2 Measuring against peak production - rather than the October levels referenced by OPEC 2.0 coalition members - is an inherently more conservative way of assessing the effect of the production cuts. 3 Please see "OPEC, non-OPEC compliance with oil cuts hits highest in May: source," published by reuters.com on June 21, 2017. 4 An uptick in Nigerian production also is cited by some observers as a cause for concern vis-à-vis slowing the normalization of global storage levels. However, as Chart 4 illustrates, that country's production remains on either side of 1.5mm b/d, more than 500k b/d below recent steady-state levels. 5 Looking at rig-count sensitivity to prices and rig productivity, we find a 1% increase (decrease) in nearby prices translates into a roughly 70bp increase (decrease) in rig counts, while a 1% increase (decrease) in lagged, deferred WTI futures prices (out to 3 years forward) translates into a 2% change in the same direction. The R2 coefficients of determination for the models we estimated average ~ 0.95. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Special Report Highlights Italy cannot rely on currency devaluation to make up for poor competitiveness, as it did before the euro; Italian voters are becoming more Euroskeptic - the elections due by May 2018 pose a serious risk, as do elections thereafter; Necessary structural reforms, not in the cards at present, would be painful and could exacerbate the Euroskeptic trend in Italy; The mere suggestion of a referendum on the euro would cause a banking crisis ... though voters would likely decide to stay in the Euro Area; The ECB will surprise on the dovish side; EUR/USD will weaken slightly below parity by mid-2018; European equities will continue to outperform U.S. equities. Feature European politics have been a boon to investors in 2017 (Chart 1). Instead of destabilizing populism, investors have gotten promises of pro-market reforms. This positive development is as we expected: we dubbed European politics "a trophy red herring" in our 2017 Strategic Outlook1 and predicted the pro-market turn in France.2 Alas, Italy remains a Sword of Damocles hanging over Europe's head. Whereas public sentiment in Europe has turned decisively in favor of integration since 2013, it remains indecisive in Italy (Chart 2). The Italian "median voter" continues to flirt with Euroskepticism, which explains why the country's anti-establishment parties have not softened their Euroskepticism to the same degree as their peers elsewhere in Europe. Chart 1European Stocks Outperform American Chart 2Italians Doubting The Euro Monetary Union In this report, we attempt to answer several questions concerning Italy: What is structurally wrong with Italy? Why is Euroskepticism appealing to Italian voters? What would happen if Euroskeptics won the upcoming election and called a referendum on Euro Area membership? What would happen if Italy left the Euro Area? Italy's Purgatory: Aversion To Creative Destruction Italy has a structural productivity problem (Chart 3). Given weak labor force and productivity growth, Italy will be in and out of recessions for much of the next decade as its growth rate oscillates around zero. Particularly concerning is the steep decline in the country's total factor productivity, which suggests that Italians struggle to make use of technological innovation and that the economy is extremely inefficient. There is a vast literature detailing the structural problems of the Italian economy.3 We focus on the three most important impediments: The unproductive South, the Mezzogiorno, remains Europe's backwater; The public sector is riven with inefficiencies; Education and innovation remain sub-par. The first problem with Italy is that it remains an extremely bifurcated economy. Its northern regions, particularly Lombardy, are as wealthy as any in Europe (Map 1). Productivity rates and education standards are on par with core Europe (Chart 4). However, the Mezzogiorno has consistently pulled the aggregate Italian averages down (Chart 5). As the industrialized North was rebuilt after the Second World War, and as productivity and labor force growth rates surged, the backwardness of the Mezzogiorno was conveniently ignored. Since the late 1990s, however, productivity rates have declined in all of the developed world. For Italy, this means that the one-third of the population that lives in the unproductive South is no longer a rounding error. At its root, Italy's problem is that its unification in 1861, the Risorgimento, never went far enough to integrate the south and thus left a bifurcated economy that exemplifies the north-south divide in Europe as a whole.4 Several of the reform efforts undertaken by the Matteo Renzi-led Democratic Party (PD) government have sought to address the disparity between the North and the Mezzogiorno. However, these reforms will take time to bear fruit. Previous efforts have fallen short due to half-hearted implementation. The second structural problem is that Italy's public sector is large, riven with inefficiencies, and largely funded via corporate taxes due to poor overall tax collection. Italy's social security contributions are high, accounting for about 13% of GDP. Of this burden, the employer contribution rate is one of the highest in the world, only surpassed by France and Germany (Chart 6). Despite a developed-world tax burden, Italy has a developing-world system of tax collection. For example, its VAT revenue ratio is well below the OECD average, at the level of an emerging market (Chart 7).5 If the VAT revenue ratio was improved to the OECD average, Italy would see its VAT receipts rise by about €45 billion per year (enough to recapitalize all of its banks, for example, or reduce employers' social security contributions by a third). Not only is tax collection of poor quality, but paying taxes is exorbitantly difficult. The World Bank's "Paying Tax" indicator - which measures the cost and time of paying taxes - nestles Italy between Kenya and São Tomé at 126th out of 190 spots! For comparison sake, its Mediterranean peers Spain and Portugal are 37th and 38th respectively on the same index while even Greece is significantly better at 64th.6 Italy again ranks with EM countries on the World Bank's overall "Doing Business" report (Chart 8). It scores extremely low in the category of "enforcing contracts," where it finds itself sandwiched between the Gambia and Somalia, at the 108th rank! It takes more time - three years - to enforce a contract in Italy than in Pakistan, Egypt, and Mozambique. Public sector inefficiencies are not a result of nostalgia for Roman-era bureaucracy. Instead, Italy's administrative hurdles are a means to stifle domestic creative destruction and protect its numerous small and medium-sized businesses - many family-owned - from competition. Instead of fostering competition through innovation and investment, Italian industrial policy since the Second World War has largely relied on currency depreciation to boost competitiveness. This strategy ceased to be effective with the adoption of the euro, but the country never pushed through painful reforms to adjust to the new reality. While it is difficult to prove a counterfactual, we are not sure that even currency devaluation would have saved Italy from the onslaught of Asian manufacturing in the late 1990s. Euro Area imports from EM Asia have surged from less than 2% of total imports to nearly 10% in the last twenty years. Italy began losing market share to Asia well before the euro was introduced on January 1, 1999, as Chart 9 illustrates. Finally, Italy's educational system is in need of a massive overhaul. Some improvement in educational attainment was apparent by 2015 (Chart 10). However, the quality of Italian education is still woefully inadequate if measured by the results of post-secondary and tertiary education on literacy proficiency (Chart 11). Chart 9Italy Lost Market Share Amid Globalization Italian firms are not making up for the poor educational attainments of the labor force with higher investment in knowledge-based capital - software, research, training, or management (Chart 12). There are likely three reasons for this outcome. First, low productivity begets low potential GDP growth, which hurts firms' top line prospects and incentives to invest. Second, decades of reliance on currency devaluation for competitiveness has discouraged Italian corporates from investing in R&D. Third, a plethora of small Italian family-owned businesses lack the resources to leverage their intellectual property with management and technology to become globally competitive. Last time Italy faced a painful recession - 1992-1995 - it did what had worked best since the Second World War: it devalued its way out of trouble (Chart 13A). Yet a comparable devaluation did not work for Italy in recent years, with exports failing to lead the way to recovery despite a 20% drop in EUR/USD since mid-2014 (Chart 13B). Why? Chart 13ACurrency Devaluation Has Not ##br##Worked This Time Around (I) Chart 13BCurrency Devaluation Has Not ##br##Worked This Time Around (II) Many of Italy's exports go to Euro Area peers. In 1995, the percentage was 48%, today it is 41%. As such, the devaluation in the 1990s was against those peers, allowing Italian exports to the EU Common Market to surge. Nonetheless, the lack of any growth in exports still does not make sense, given the large depreciation in the euro and the fact that 60% of Italy's exports are still destined for non-Euro Area markets. Bottom Line: Italy has failed to keep up in competitiveness over the past twenty years precisely because its reliance on devaluation worked wonders for the economy in the pre-euro era. Instead of committing itself to structural reforms, Italy has preserved its post-Second World War institutions that were expressly designed to limit creative destruction and domestic competition. Unlike France, which has largely an arithmetic problem, Italy has a genuine productivity problem. For Italy to boost economic growth, it will have to do a lot more than adjust a few labor laws or raise the retirement age (both of which it has already done!). It needs deep structural reforms that are impossible without a strong electoral mandate that gives the next government sufficient political capital for reforms. Such a mandate is unlikely to come in the next election, leaving Italy in a purgatory of its own making. Political Risks: An Assessment Current polls show that the ruling, center-left PD is running neck-and-neck with the anti-establishment and Euroskeptic Five Star Movement (M5S) (Chart 14). Also in the mix are the center-right Forza Italia (FI), of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, which has itself flirted with mild Euroskepticism, and the staunchly anti-EU Lega Nord (LN). The power of Italy's establishment and Euroskeptic parties is perfectly balanced (Chart 15) ahead of the general election, which has to take place before May 20, 2018. The exact date is as yet unclear, with President Sergio Mattarella insisting that it take place after parliament passes a new electoral law that will make the electoral system uniform for both houses of parliament. A recent agreement between the main four parties on an electoral bill broke down, again pushing the date to the second quarter of next year. With the election now likely a year away - and with European populists in retreat across the continent - should investors breathe a sigh of relief? Chart 14Euroskeptic Five Star Movement Challenges Ruling Democrats Chart 15Euroskeptics Roughly Equal To Establishment Parties In Polls No. Italy remains the political risk in Europe. There are three broad reasons we remain concerned about Italian politics: The Median Italian Voter Is Flirting With Euroskepticism Policymakers are not price makers in the political marketplace, but price takers. The price maker is the median voter.7 In Europe, the Euroskepticism of the median voter has been massively overstated by the media and markets. Across the Euro Area, support for the common currency has surged since 2013 (Chart 16), likely reflecting an improving economy and the deeply held belief among European voters that continental integration is an intrinsic good. It took some time for anti-establishment politicians to sound off the median voter, but when they did, they adjusted their stances. As such, initially Euroskeptic anti-establishment parties across the continent - from Greece's SYRIZA and Spain's Podemos to Finland's "Finns Party" - have abandoned overt Euroskepticism and moved towards the middle ground on European integration. Politicians who have refused to be price takers - and insisted on campaigning from an inflexible, Euroskeptic position - were punished by the political marketplace (case in point: Marine Le Pen). Italy, however, has not seen a recovery in support for European integration. This is in large part due to the fact that the Italian economy has remained a laggard since 2012 (Chart 17). But it may also reflect the fact that the siren song of currency depreciation remains appealing to a large segment of the Italian electorate. Both M5S and Lega Nord have been vociferously arguing that Italy was far more competitive before joining the Euro Area and that simple currency devaluation would turn Italy from a land of locusts into a land of milk and honey. Chart 16Support For The Euro Has Risen Everywhere Else Chart 17Lagging Economy Has Hurt Support For The Euro Italy's Relationship With The EU Is Transactional We have long contended that both European patricians and plebeians support further integration.8 Chart 18 shows that a strong majority of Europeans is outright pessimistic about the future of their country outside of the EU. Why? Because, as Chart 19 suggests, the EU stands for geopolitical stability and a stronger say in the world. Chart 18Most Europeans Fear Life Outside The EU For a majority of Europeans, the European project is essential for peace and stability in Europe. We would argue that this is not just a product of two world wars in the twentieth century. It is also a product of newfound Russian assertiveness, migration crisis, and a growing ideological distance between Europe and its former security guarantor, the U.S. Italians, on the other hand, appear to be significantly more "transactional" than their European peers. For example, Chart 19 shows that Italians stand apart in being significantly less concerned about "peace" and having a "stronger say in the world." A plurality of Italians has also become confident in the country's future outside of the EU (Chart 20). Italians also appear to have the most negative perception of immigrants, perhaps due to the fact that they are at the frontline of Europe's migration crisis (Chart 21). Chart 20Italians Not So Afraid Of Life Outside The EU Why such a discrepancy in views between Italy and the rest of the continent? First, Italians have traditionally had a much more parochial view of the world. Regional differences matter a lot more to Italians than continental ones. Italians are already being asked to subsume one identity (regional) for another (national), so going a step further (supranational) may be too much. Data suggests that about half of all Italians are unwilling to go further (Chart 22). Second, Italy joined the EU as a considerably less developed economy than its core European peers. As such, membership was always sold to Italians from a transactional perspective and thus they do not give supremacy to geopolitical over economic forces. Chart 22Italians Less Likely To See Themselves As Europeans Elections Are Unlikely To Be Cathartic Italian Euroskeptics have consistently performed well in the polls for well over a year. Short of a significant surge in support for Matteo Renzi's PD, which we doubt will happen, polls are likely to continue to be tight until the election. The anti-establishment M5S performed extremely poorly in the June 11 municipal elections, failing to make the second-round run-off of the mayoral election in any of the major cities. However, we would fade the significance of this result given the national polls. As such, the best hope for investors is that anti-establishment forces suffer a modest defeat in next year's election. Short of a strong economic recovery that significantly reduces unemployment, an election win for the Italian establishment will not be as cathartic as the just-concluded election in France. And what are the odds of an outright Euroskeptic win? They are low, below 20%. M5S has no incentive to form a weak minority government, support an establishment-led government, or enter a risky coalition with Euroskeptic Lega Nord. It understands that remaining in the opposition would allow it to reap the benefits when the eventual coalition between establishment parties loses steam. The most likely scenario in next year's election is either an establishment Grand Coalition (40%), or a minority center-left government led by the ruling PD and supported on a case-by-case basis by the other parties (40%).9 Neither outcome is likely to survive the entire length of the mandate. Bottom Line: The long-term problem for investors is that the Euroskeptic narrative appears to be quite appealing to a large proportion of the Italian public. As such, even if the market avoids a crisis in 2018, one will likely emerge by 2020. The only way to avoid it would be a strong electoral mandate for deep structural reforms that boost productivity, which is not a likely outcome of the next election. But even if such reforms were initiated, we assume that their short-term consequences would be economic and political pain, which would sour support for establishment parties further and potentially deepen Euroskeptic sentiment in the country. As such, in the rest of the report, we examine what investors should expect in case the anti-establishment parties eventually take power in Italy. While such an outcome is unlikely in 2018, it may happen eventually. Leaving The Euro Is A Panacea... The political analysis above begs a simple question: Why are Italians more likely to be lured by the sirens of leaving the Euro Area than the French or Spanish have been? Fundamentally, the Italian experience is one of relatively successful devaluations. In the early 1990s, Italy was also suffering from a period of un-competitiveness, which prompted the current account to move from a 0.6% of GDP surplus in 1987 to a 2.5% of GDP deficit in 1992 (Chart 23). This deterioration reflected two factors. One was the notorious European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which forced European currencies to move in lockstep with each other. The second was the fact that Italian unit labor costs had been in a bull market relative to the rest of the European community countries, rising by 380%, 140%, and 370% against German, France, and the Netherlands, respectively, between 1970 and 1991. Thanks to this confluence of events, Italy was in a bind. By early 1992, Italian real wages were contracting. More than a surge in inflation, this contraction reflected intensifying competitive pressures and the implementation of fiscal austerity (Chart 24). Investors ended up punishing Italian assets; Italian yields moved up, with spreads relative to Germany widening from 350 basis points to 750 basis points by September 1992. Chart 23Lack Of Competitiveness Caused Current Account Deficits... Chart 24...And Contributed To Falling Real Wages By that point, Italian authorities chose to let the previously stable lira fall, resulting in a 30% devaluation versus the deutschemark by the end of Q1 1993. Thanks to this easing, by the beginning of 1994 Italian spreads had fallen back below 300 basis points. However, the Italian economy was still under duress, real wages were still contracting, and financial markets revolted again. By February 1995, Italian spreads had gone back up to 480 basis points. In the spring of 1995, the pressures came to a boiling point and the lira was once again devalued versus the deutschemark, suddenly plunging by an additional 20% or so. After this painful adjustment, real wage growth moved back into positive territory, the current account deficit morphed into a surplus, and the economy recovered. Moreover, thanks to the previous wave of fiscal austerity and the rebound of the economy, the government's primary balance, which stood at a deficit of nearly 4% of GDP in 1987, hit a 5% surplus by 1998. Chart 25Domestic Demand Never Recovered From Financial Crisis So why is this experience so important? Today, Italy already runs a large current account surplus of 2.5% of GDP. But unlike in the 1990s, this improvement reflects first and foremost a contraction in imports, itself the symptom of an ill domestic economy. However, like in the early 1990s, the Italian economy remains tired. Real GDP is still 7% below its 2008 peak, while domestic demand continues to linger at a stunning 8.5% below its pre-GFC levels (Chart 25). Real wages are contracting at a 1.4% pace as the unemployment rate remains more than 2.5% above the OECD's estimate of NAIRU. Real estate prices, after having contracted from 2012 to 2016, are only growing in the low single digits. Capex generally is also tepid. This situation suggests that Italy needs even easier monetary policy than what it is getting from the ECB. As the argument goes, if Italy were to devalue its currency today, it would be able to boost its exports, ease domestic monetary conditions, and create the ideal circumstances for generating growth. Moreover, to push the argument to its extreme - something populist politicians are prone to do - Italy should ditch the euro and re-dominate its debt in lira. The Bank of Italy could then monetize this debt to keep interest rates low. Since Italy runs a primary fiscal surplus of 1.4% of GDP, Italy does not need to access the debt market for a few years, and thus it would be irrelevant if it loses access to the market. In other words, outside of the euro, a world of Chianti and creamy cannolis awaits the Italians. ... Well, Maybe Not If this seems too nice to be true, that is because it is. The exit-and-devalue narrative misses the point that financial markets and conditions matter a great deal. The problem with this story is the banking sector. The Italian banking sector is presently saddled with NPLs of €330bn, representing 74% of the banking system's capital and reserves (Chart 26). In and of itself, this is a big problem. However, it is a manageable one, especially with the backstops created by European institutions, notably the support of the ECB. However, without Europe's backstop, this debt load becomes a lot harder to manage. And that's only part of the problem. A deeper issue is the large holdings of treasury bonds (BTPs) of Italian banks. Currently, Italian banks hold 10% of their assets in BTPs, an amount equivalent to 90% of their capital and reserves (Chart 27). In 2011, when the Euro Area crisis was raging, Italian 10-year yields hit 7%, or a spread of more than 500 basis points over German bunds. This was equivalent to an implied probability of breakup - as estimated by Dhaval Joshi who writes our European Investment Strategy sister service - of 20% over the subsequent five years (Chart 28).10 Chart 26Italian Banks Carry Loads Of Bad Loans Chart 27Italian Banks Also Hold Too Many BTPs Chart 28Italian Spreads Signal Euro Break-Up Threat Now, if Italy comes to be governed by Beppe Grillo's M5S, markets will move fast to discount an eventual referendum on Italy's euro membership - even if only a non-binding and consultative referendum, which would still have a powerful political effect.11 In this environment, it is unlikely that the ECB would support Italian assets. The ECB has already played an active role in Italian politics. It was a September 2011 letter by Mario Draghi and Jean-Claude Trichet that prompted the resignation of Berlusconi in November 2011. It was only after Italian policymakers committed to structural reforms that Draghi was willing to utter his famous "whatever it takes" pledge of ECB support. There is practically no chance that the ECB would extend such a guarantee to an M5S-led government looking to play chicken with the Euro Area and default on Italian debt. Chart 29A Drop In Credit Impulse Would Herald Recession This is why the situation could become nasty, and fast. With only 53% of Italians in favor of the euro, pricing in a 50% probability of Italy leaving the Euro Area would result in BTP-bund spreads of around 900 basis points! In the process, Italian bonds could lose 40% to 50% of their value - assuming that German bunds rally on risk aversion flows - which would result in a potential 35% to 45% hit to Italian banks' capital and reserves. Even if markets remained relatively calm, and BTP prices only fell by 25% to 30%, investors would discount bank capital by around 25%. With the large overhang of NPLs, Italian banks would be for all intent and purposes insolvent. We already expect the Italian credit impulse to become a drag on Italian growth in 2018, but if banks are threatened with insolvency as a result of political dynamics, this same credit impulse is likely to fall at rates not experienced since the GFC. This would result in yet another recession in Italy (Chart 29). Like in Greece in 2015, we would expect that this economic pain would prompt Italian voters to rethink their inclination to leave the Euro Area. In other words, the mere thought of exiting the Euro Area would bring forward the cost of such a strategy, giving voters essentially a preview of their future pain. Moreover, with 45% of BTPs held in private hands outside of Italy, and Italy's foreign debt hanging at 126% of GDP, Europeans outside of Italy have a lot of Italian exposure. This suggests that the financial channel of transmission would cause stress in the European banking sector outside of Italy as well. As a result, in all likelihood, this threat would prompt the return of dovish language by the ECB that could weigh on the euro. The fall in the euro would also nullify Italians' need to exit the Eurozone. Even if the scenario above looks remote, the euro could fall as soon as markets begin discounting an M5S victory. For example, in Canada, the Parti Quebecois won the 1994 election promising a referendum on the question of Quebec independence. As a result of that electoral victory, the loonie quickly dipped by 6%. A move back to EUR/USD 1.05 in case of a Beppe Grillo victory thus sounds reasonable as the market would quickly move to discount some probability of an eventual euro referendum in Italy. Bottom Line: The mere suggestion of a referendum on the euro in Italy would have immediate market consequences. The result would be the almost instantaneous insolvency of large portions of the country's banking system, the loss of ECB support, deposit flight, and an almost certain recession. The relationship between politics, markets, and the economy is therefore dynamic, with non-linear outcomes. As markets discount a higher probability of Italian Euro Area exit, voters will discount a higher probability of non-optimal economic outcomes. As such, we highly doubt that Italian voters - who remember, are only flirting with Euroskepticism - would commit to a future outside of the Euro Area. What If Italy Says Arrivederci? What if we have misjudged Italian voters and they vote to exit the Euro Area regardless of the costs? Based on the IMF's External Sector Report's Individual Economy Assessments, the Italian real effective exchange rate is overvalued by around 25% against Germany alone and around 15% against a GDP-weighted average of Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands, and Belgium. However, these amounts grossly underestimate the potential fall in the lira. These estimates are based on competitiveness measures alone, and they do not take into account the negative domestic economic developments associated with falling BTP prices and impairments to banks' balance sheets. Such economic malaise would prompt a massive easing of policy by the newly empowered Bank of Italy, which would also weigh on the lira. Additionally, the Bank of Italy would have little credibility. This would be doubly so in a M5S-led government intent on pursuing unorthodox policy choices. Historically, Italy has been tolerant of elevated inflation, which means that investors would likely bid up inflation protection on Italian assets, a process that would weigh on Italian real interest rates. Additionally, Italian households and businesses would likely ratchet up their own inflation expectations. As a result, this would drive Italian inflation higher and prompt even more downward pressure on real rates. This is the perfect recipe for a downward spiral in the lira against the euro. In this kind of environment, the lira could fall 75% against the euro. Would Italy become a trade champion with this magnitude of currency devaluation? Doubtful. As we have mentioned, Italy's competitiveness problems are not just a function of domestic labor costs relative to those of the rest of the Euro Area. They also reflect the fact that Italy has not moved up the value chain and is competing head-to-head with EM nations that have a much lower cost base. Additionally, the purpose of the euro was to prevent precisely the kind of competitive currency devaluation that plagued Europe in the post-war period. If Italy ditches the euro and devalues its currency by 50% or more, then the other European nations are likely to punish Italy with tariffs, defeating one of the key reasons to re-introduce the lira in the first place. The last thing Europeans would want to establish is a precedent of a major European economy massively devaluing against its Common Market peers for economic gain. This would be the undoing of not just the Euro Area, but European integration itself. In fact, Italy is contractually obligated - as is every EU member state other than Denmark and the U.K. - to obtain EMU membership under the Maastricht Treaty that establishes the European Union. While such a contractual obligation is irrelevant in the face of a sovereign nation's decision to abrogate an international treaty, it does give Italy's EU peers the legal cover to evict Italy from the Common Market should it break its Maastricht pledges. What about the dynamics of the euro itself? After all, without its weakest major member, the Euro Area will be stronger and the euro will become more competitive. However, the early 1990s experience is once again instructive. During the first phase of devaluation of the lira from 1992 to 1994, the deutschemark too came under pressure. This pressure also reflected the fact that the USD was rising between Q3 1992 and the beginning of 1994. However, by early 1995 the deutschmark had recouped all its loss versus the USD (Chart 30). We would expect similar dynamics to be at play, and again, a lot will depend on the dollar's trend. We expect the dollar index (DXY) to peak in 2018 around 108-110, or a bit more than 10% above current levels. This would hurt the euro. Moreover, the likely need for a dovish ECB to ease the blow to the European banking system (from potentially large losses on any Italian assets) would add to the downward pressure on the euro. As a result, an Italian exit should result in a fall to EUR/USD 0.9. However, this would represent a massive buying opportunity. The euro would be extremely cheap, and the economy would ultimately handle the Italian shock (Chart 31). Chart 30Lira Devaluation Temporarily Dragged Down The Deutschemark Chart 31An Italian-Inspired Drop In The Euro Would Present A Buying Opportunity Additionally, the pain that Italy would incur as it faced currency collapse, runaway inflation, and loss of market access to the EU Common Market should act as a strong deterrent for future Euro Area exit attempts. As such, while the probability of Italy's Euro Area exit may be higher than zero, the probability of any subsequent exits is essentially zero. We would therefore expect any euro selloff to be violent but brief. Chart 32Italian Public Debt: Stuck In Muck Bottom Line: We doubt Italy will ever leave the euro. In all likelihood, the economic pain caused by the mere thought of a referendum would be enough to deter Italians from voting for what would amount to economic suicide. Instead, we would expect Italy to muddle through: its public debt dynamics will worsen, but it will not implode. The IMF expects the government debt-to-GDP ratio to fall toward 125% of GDP by 2022 (Chart 32). We think this is too optimistic. It relies on a big drop in the private sector's investment-saving gap. We think that Italy's entrenched productivity deficit and lack of investment opportunities south of the Alps will ensure that savings remain in excess of investment by a similar degree as today. This would cause the public debt-to-GDP ratio to move toward 140% of GDP by the middle of next decade. This is not a great scenario, but it is not a catastrophe either. In exchange for modest reforms, the ECB would continue to support Italy with dovish monetary policy and unfettered access to emergency liquidity. As a result, we expect European interest rates to remain slightly below what average Eurozone numbers would justify. As such, we continue to anticipate no hike in the ECB's repo rate for the foreseeable future. This, along with greater labor market slack in Europe than the U.S., underpins our view that EUR/USD will ultimately weaken slightly below parity. Investment Conclusions All other things being equal, currency devaluation is a valuable reflationary tool. In Italy's case, however, there are two impediments to using it. First, Italy has lost competitiveness precisely because it relied on the FX lever in the past. Its governance, education, and economic institutions have atrophied as domestic interest groups favored protecting themselves against creative destruction. Second, when it comes to politics, "all other things are rarely equal." It is highly unlikely that the rest of Europe would idly stand back while Italy switched to the lira and devalued it against the euro. This is for three reasons: First, it would set a dangerous precedent for other EU member states if Italy, the Euro Area's third-largest economy and the world's eighth largest, was allowed to reflate via competitive devaluation. Second, it is unlikely that Euro Area peers would accept Italy's devaluation amidst a globally low growth context where export market share is already tough to come by. Third, Italy's government would likely be led by populist, anti-establishment policymakers who would represent a domestic political threat to Italy's European neighbors. As such, it would be in the interest of the rest of Europe to ensure that a M5S-led Italy collapsed after leaving the Euro Area, and then begged to re-enter the core European club. The investment conclusions from the analysis above are very state dependent and represent a playbook for investors going forward. Right now, with the probability of an outright M5S victory low, our base case scenario remains unchanged. The euro will weaken by mid-2018 to slightly below parity as the ECB will maintain a more dovish policy stance than the Fed. European equities are likely to continue to outperform U.S. equities. However, if Beppe Grillo manages to eke out a majority in 2018 or later, investors might be in for a bumpy ride. The euro's fall from grace is likely to be much swifter and European assets could suffer a period of volatility and underperformance relative to the U.S. Ultimately, European stocks will resume their upward relative trajectory as any Italian referendum is likely to result in Italy staying in the euro. Finally, in the highly unlikely case that Italy votes to leave the Euro Area, the euro could plunge to EUR/USD 0.9; European assets, banks especially, could suffer greatly against their U.S. counterparts; and bund yields would likely fall below 0%. The lira would fall by 75% against the euro and Italian bonds would suffer losses north of 50%, in local currency terms. As Italy plunged to its post-Euro Area Inferno, however, we would expect European assets to represent the buying opportunity of a lifetime. Italy's fall from grace would only tighten European integration going forward. 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see OECD, "Economic Surveys: Italy 2017," available at oecd.org; and Sara Calligaris, et al.,"Italy's Productivity Conundrum," European Commission, dated May 2016, available at ec.europa.eu. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 The VAT revenue ratio (VRR) is defined as the ratio between the actual value-added tax (VAT) revenue collected and the revenue that would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final consumption. This ratio gives an indication of the efficiency and the broadness of the tax base of the VAT regime in a country compared to a standard norm. 6 Please see World Bank Group and PwC, "Paying Taxes 2017," available at www.pwc.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration," dated November 3, 2011, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 A minority government would, however, have to obtain a confidence vote in both chambers of the Italian Parliament in order to govern, as per Article 94 of the Italian Constitution. 10 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Threats And Opportunities In The Bond Market," dated April 7, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 11 According to Article 75 of the Italian Constitution, referendums are not permitted in the "case of tax, budget, amnesty and pardon laws, in authorization or ratification of international treaties." Nonetheless, a Euroskeptic government could still call for a non-binding referendum on the euro. While its result would not create a legal reality for Italian exit from the Euro Area, it would create a political one. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) ... Why Nations Fail - The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty Why Nations Fail is as much about why nations succeed as why they fail.1 World history is replete with examples of the latter, whereas the former is a rarity even today. Economist Daren Acemoglu and political scientist James A. Robinson seek to answer why that is so. Distilling the book to its bottom line is challenging. There is no neat theory of how the world works. Instead, the authors tell their story through case studies replete with "critical junctures," "path dependency," and "small differences." Acemoglu and Robinson do not peddle in false parsimony, but rather try to develop a narrative that explains a complex process. While they never make the point explicitly, the authors define success as a combination of geopolitical relevance (power), escaping the "middle income trap" (prosperity), and some level of equality (escaping poverty). A country that achieves some semblance of all three, and maintains it for a long time, is "successful." At the heart of successful economies is the process of creative destruction. And at the heart of each example of failed states - from the Roman Empire to the Soviet Union - are impediments to such destruction. The recipe to success therefore boils down to "having an idea, starting a firm, and getting a loan." The discipline of economics - and its disciples at the IMF and the World Bank - would appear to be more than capable of taking it from there. But they are not. Why? For Acemoglu and Robinson, the empirical evidence is overwhelmingly stacked against economics and its practitioners. Armies of developmental economists have failed to bring billions of people out of poverty and many of their suggestions have in fact been detrimental. Economics is incapable of resolving the problem of development because it "has gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its domain."2 And societal development is a political problem. The first such political problem that Acemoglu and Robinson attempt to explain is the paradox of development. Why don't leaders always choose prosperity? History is replete with examples of how elites actively subvert creative destruction, which is paradoxical given that it would make their societies wealthier and more powerful in the collective sense. From the patricians of Rome, elites of Venice, the szlachta of Poland, the samurai of Japan, to the landed aristocracy of England prior to the Glorious Revolution, those in positions of power consciously limit economic progress. The answer lies in political institutions. When political power is exclusive, unchecked, and limited to a select-group, its value increases. The more power one gains, the greater the political, economic, and societal rewards one can extract from it. The reverse is true when political institutions are inclusive, checked, and open to upwardly mobile entrepreneurs. In that case, the value of political power declines and thus elites are less likely to expend resources to protect their access to it. As such, the key conditions for economic development are inclusive political institutions that allow non-elites to petition the government, keep it in check through an independent judiciary, call it to account with free media, and eventually participate in governing directly. These inclusive political institutions are, in turn, more likely to give rise to inclusive economic institutions, which enshrine the process of creative destruction at the heart of the country's political and economic system. Why is it so difficult to engineer development? Because most trained economists working for international developmental agencies are focused on changing economic institutions. They take the politics of a country as an a priori. However, it is politics that determines economics, not the other way around. A powerful example in the book is the process of de-colonization in Africa. Despite a dramatic change of political leadership, post-colonial governments preserved the extractive economic institutions set up by their former colonial masters. Why? Because they never bothered to truly enfranchise their citizens. In other words, they kept the exclusive political institutions of colonialism largely in place. Once that decision was made, it was inevitable that extractive economic institutions would remain in place as well. In fact, in most examples, economic institutions became more extractive and political institutions more exclusive. Acemoglu and Robinson published their book in 2012, at the height of the "Beijing Consensus" narrative. It is easy to see how most of their examples are applicable to China today, particularly the chapter dealing with the decline of the Soviet Union. The message is that rapid economic growth under exclusive political institutions is possible, but unsustainable. China will therefore either evolve its political institutions or face the fate of the Soviet Union. We generally tend to agree with this analysis, but time horizons are difficult to gauge. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson themselves admit that the Soviet Union grew rapidly for 40 years before it faced limits and 60 years before it collapsed. By those measures, Chinese policymakers may still have decades before crisis forces their hand. A much more interesting question, one that Acemoglu and Robinson spend very little time discussing, is what happens to societies where elites capture political institutions and alter them from inclusive to exclusive? Two examples they detail briefly are the Roman and Venetian republics. In both, relatively inclusive political systems with inclusive economic institutions were captured by rapacious elites who then proceeded to limit access to both with the particular intention of limiting creative destruction. For global investors, this is the process that will have greater implications than the run-of-the-mill collapse of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. The entire global financial system today depends on the domestic stability of countries like the U.S. and the U.K., perhaps the most successful political systems in the world. And yet, voters in both are itching for radical change as a reaction to elite overproduction and growing income inequality. On one hand, voter discontent could lead to a messy political process, if not an outright revolution, that reestablishes the inclusive institutions that have underpinned their prosperity and power for centuries. On the other, it could lead to the collapse of the inclusive republic and the rise of an exclusive empire. 1 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 2 Economist Abba Lerner, quoted at the end of Chapter 2 by the authors. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com
Special Report Highlights The European Central Bank's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and, by extension, boosted German manufacturing. Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. As a result of this and labor shortages, wages in central Europe are rising rapidly, and inflation is accelerating. The Polish and Czech central banks will be forced to hike rates sooner than later. Hungary's central bank will lag behind. Go long the PLN versus the IDR. Stay long the CZK versus the euro and the PLN against the HUF. Feature Inflation in central Europe is picking up and will continue to rise (Chart I-1). The main driver is surging wage growth in central Europe. Considerable acceleration in wage growth, in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic signifies genuine inflationary pressures that could very well spread. Based on this, our primary investment recommendation is to be long the PLN and CZK versus the euro and/or EM currencies. Labor Shortages There is a shortage of labor in the central European manufacturing economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This partially reflects similar trends in Germany and its increased use of outsourcing to central European countries. Escalating wage growth (Chart I-2) in central European economies denotes widening labor shortages. Chart I-1Inflation Is Rising In CE3 Chart I-2Labor Shortages = Higher Wages Indeed, our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - has surged of late across all central European countries (Chart I-3). The same measure for Germany is at a 27-year high (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B illustrate both components of the ratio: the number of job vacancies has skyrocketed to all-time highs and the number of unemployed people has dropped to multi-decade lows as well. Chart I-3Labor Is Scarce In CE3 And Germany Chart I-4AA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Chart I-4BA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Importantly, it is not the case that labor shortages are occurring because people are discouraged and giving up on their search for work. The participation rate for all these countries has risen to its highest level since data have been available. In brief, a rising share of the population in these countries is either working or actively looking for a job. (Chart I-5). Finally, their working age population is shrinking (Chart I-6), with Germany being the exception because of immigration inflows (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Labor Participation Rate Is ##br##High In CE3 And Germany... Chart I-6...While Working Age ##br##Population Is Declining In CE3 Robust labor demand has been occurring in central Europe because of the ongoing manufacturing boom in the region. Given central Europe's extensive supply chain linkages to German manufacturing, the artificial cheapness of the euro that the ECB engineered has boosted the German economy and by extension central Europe's manufacturing boom. Germany: A Cheap Currency And Export Boom The ECB's ultra-accommodative policy has suppressed the value of the euro, and caused German exports to mushroom (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-7ECB Policies Have Been ##br##A Boon For German Exports A cheap common European currency has boosted Germany's manufacturing competitiveness and has led to rising demand for German exports. An overflow of manufacturing orders in Germany in turn has led to labor shortages in central Europe via increased German outsourcing. Currency appreciation is the conventional economic adjustment in a country with a flexible exchange rate and an export boom coupled with a large current account surplus. However, this has not occurred in Germany in recent years. This is because of the ECB's ultra-easy policies. The euro has depreciated even as the German and euro area overall current account has mushroomed (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Since the currency has not been allowed to appreciate in nominal terms, the real effective exchange rate will inevitably appreciate via inflation - rising wages initially and broader inflation increases later. In our opinion, the best currency valuation measure is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. Our basis is that this measure reflects both changes in productivity and wages - i.e. it reflects genuine competitiveness. Chart I-8 demonstrates Germany's real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs in absolute terms compared to other advanced manufacturing competitors like the U.S., Japan, Switzerland and Sweden. Based on this measure, it is clear that Germany continues to enjoy a significant comparative advantage on the manufacturing world stage among advanced manufacturing economies. It is only less competitive versus Japan. Chart I-8Germany Is Very Competitive Based On Real Effective Exchange Rates Bottom Line: The ECB's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and boosted German manufacturing. This has boosted central European manufacturing and demand for labor. Germany Is Passing The Inflation Baton To Central Europe Despite a historic low in the unemployment rate and ongoing labor shortages, German wages have not risen by much (Chart I-9). Our hunch is that German companies faced with some labor shortages have been increasing their use of outsourcing. Central European economy's export to Germany have boomed, especially after the euro started depreciating circa 2010 (Chart I-10). Chart I-9German Wage Inflation Is Muted Chart I-10Growing Dependence On ##br##Germany For CE3 Growth Being the lower marginal cost producer in the region, central European economies have benefited from German competitiveness and the cheap euro. Outsourcing is economically justified because German wages are still four times higher than in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. (Chart I-11). Even though Germany's productivity is higher than in central Europe, manufacturing wages adjusted for productivity are still higher than in central European economies (Chart I-12). Therefore, it still makes sense for German businesses to outsource more to lower-cost producers in central Europe. Chart I-11CE3 Wage Bill Is Cheaper ##br##Than That Of Germany... Chart I-12...Even After Adjusting ##br##For Productivity Faced with strong orders as well as a lack of available labor, businesses in central European countries have been competing for labor by raising wages. Unlike in Germany, manufacturing and overall wages in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have recently surged (Chart I-2 on page 3). Wages are rising more so in Hungary and the Czech Republic since they have smaller labor pools compared to Poland. Notably, wage growth has exceeded productivity growth, and unit labor costs have been rising rather rapidly (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Unit Labor Costs Are Rising Rapidly In CE3 Higher unit labor costs amid rising output denote genuine inflationary pressures. Producers faced with rising unit labor costs and shrinking profit margins will attempt to raise prices. Given that income and demand are strong, they will partially succeed - meaning genuine inflationary pressures in central Europe are likely to intensify. Since the beginning of the ECB's accommodative monetary policy, Germany has been able to avoid the fallout of higher wages because it has been able to outsource a portion of its production to other countries, namely central Europe. The problem is that the supply of labor in central Europe is now drying out, so its price will naturally rise. If Germany did not have the labor pool of CE3 available as a resource, German wage inflation would be significantly higher by now because companies would have been forced to employ Germans more rapidly, paying more in labor costs. Bottom Line: Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. Overheating In Central Europe Various inflation measures are showing signs that inflation is escalating in CE3. With rising wages and unit labor costs, these trends will continue. Consequently, output gaps in central European economies are closing or have closed, warranting further increases in inflation (Chart I-14). Money and credit growth are booming, which is further facilitating the rise in inflation (Chart I-15). Finally, employment growth is very robust and retail sales are strong (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Inflation Will Remain On An Up Trend In CE3 Chart I-15Money & Credit Will Facilitate Path To Inflation Chart I-16Employment & Retail Sales Growth Is Robust Bottom Line: A cheap euro has supercharged German demand for central European labor at the time when the pool of available labor in CE3 is shrinking. This has generated genuine inflationary pressures in the region. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations 1. The Polish and Czech central banks will hike rates sooner than later. This will boost their currencies. The Hungarian central bank will lag and the HUF will underperform its regional peers. CE3 currencies are set to appreciate, especially the CZK and the PLN: stay long the PLN versus the HUF, and the CZK versus the euro. We recommended going long PLN/HUF and long CZK/EUR on September 28 2016 due to stronger growth and rising inflationary pressures. This week's analysis reinforces our conviction on these trades. In the face of rising inflationary pressures, the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) will be less reluctant to tighten policy than the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and the ECB. This will drive the PLN and CZK higher relative to the EUR and HUF. The NBH is unlikely to tighten policy while credit growth is still weak. Given strong political pressure for faster economic growth, our bias is that the NBH is more interested in ending six years of non-existent credit growth rather than containing inflation. The ECB is unlikely to tighten policy either, given the still-poor structural growth outlook among the peripheral European economies. A new currency trade: go long the PLN versus the IDR, while closing our short IDR/long HUF trade with a 9% loss. This is based on our expectations that central European currencies will appreciate versus their EM peers, and the PLN will do better than the HUF. 2. Relative growth trajectory favors Central European economies relative to other EM countries. Such economic outperformance and resulting currency appreciation will be a tailwind to CE3 equity performance versus EM in common currency terms. Continue overweighting CE3 equity markets within the EM benchmark. We recommended equity traders go long CE3 banks / short euro area banks on April 6, 2016. This position has not worked out due to a significant rally in euro area banks since Brexit. However, euro area banks remain less profitable and overleveraged compared to their central European counterparts. As such they will likely underperform in the coming months. 3. In fixed income, we have the following positions: Overweight Hungarian sovereign credit within an EM sovereign credit portfolio. Long Polish and Hungarian 5-year local currency bonds / short South African and Turkish domestic bonds. A new trade: Receive 1-year Hungarian swap rates / Pay 10-year swap rates. As structural inflationary pressures become rampant in the Hungarian economy, the market will start pricing in rate hikes further down the curve, and the yield curve will consequently steepen (Chart I-17). Polish and Czech bonds offer better value relative to bunds as investors stand to gain from currency appreciation as well as an attractive spread. (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Bet On Yield Curve ##br##Steepening In Hungary Chart I-18Polish & Czech Bond Offer Value ##br##Relative To German Bunds Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Neutral The S&P hypermarkets index has been a stalwart performer YTD, outshining both the broad consumer staples universe and the overall market by a wide margin. However; this impressive run-up is unsustainable. Three main headwinds suggest that some caution is warranted: soft pricing power, likely further aggravated by new German competitors expanding in/entering the U.S. market, the ongoing and recently escalated assault from online retailers and finally, improved consumer spending. These factors imply that profit margins will remain under chronic pressure, but concerns could become more acute on a cyclical basis. Consumer goods import prices have surged in recent months (second panel), and the depreciating U.S. dollar is likely to sustain this uptrend. Cutthroat competition means that retailers will likely absorb these rising costs, to the detriment of profit margins. Further, livelier consumer spending would warn of additional headwinds (third panel), as higher incomes boost the incentive for consumers to "trade up" and shop at higher ticket stores. Netting it out, we recommend booking modest profits and downgrading exposure in the S&P hypermarkets index to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HYPC - WMT, COST.
Neutral One quarter ago, we posited that the consolidation phase in the broad consumer discretionary sector restored value and created an attractive entry point and an upgrade in the S&P restaurants sub-index provided an attractive way to execute that thesis. This view has largely played out, as restaurant shares have bested the market by double digits since March 20th. We doubt there is any more upside left. The National Restaurant Association's Restaurant Performance Index fell to the boom/bust 100 line and downside momentum has accelerated (second panel). Leading indicators of profit margins have also eroded. An uptick in commodity input costs and multi-decade highs in the industry's wage bill, which are running at close to 10% annual growth, stand in marked contrast with soft industry pricing power. Our restaurants profit margin gauge captures all of these forces and warns that a squeeze looms (third panel). In sum, the playable rally in the S&P restaurants index has run its course and a profit recovery is fully discounted in frothy valuations. We recommend booking profits of 11% in the S&P restaurants index and moving to a benchmark allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5REST - MCD, SBUX, YUM, DRI, CMG.