Financial Markets
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of April 30, 2018. There are no significant changes in the model's allocation this month, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD, %) As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 20 bps in April, largely driven by the Level 2 model which outperformed by 44 bps while the Level 1 model outperformed only by 2 bps. Since going live, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World by 156 bps, due to the 493 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model which allocates funds among 11 non-U.S. countries. The Level 1 model (which allocates funds between U.S. and the non-U.S.) is on par with the MSCI world benchmark.Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Text below For more details on the models, please see Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model," dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of April 30, 2018. For the third consecutive month, the model maintains a defensive positioning generating an alpha of 60 bps for the month of April. Following the end of trade threats (for now), the growth component of the model has stabilized. But, overall the model maintains the same weights from last month with an aggregate tilt of 1.3% towards defensive sectors. Energy remains the only cyclical sector with an overweight on the back of favorable valuations and improving momentum. Among defensive sectors, utilities maintains a large overweight of 5% on the back of better momentum. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," dated July 27, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Senior Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Looking Beyond The Next Few Months The next couple of months could remain tricky for equity markets. But, with economic growth set to remain above trend for another year or so and central banks cautious about the pace of monetary tightening, we continue to expect risk assets to outperform over the 12-month horizon. To begin, our short-term concerns. Global growth has clearly slowed in recent months, with Q1 U.S. GDP growth coming in at 2.3%, well below the 2.9% in Q4; global PMIs have also come down from their recent peaks, led by the euro zone and Japan (Chart 1). Inflation has begun to spook investors, with a sharp pick-up in core U.S. inflation, including a rise to 1.9% YoY in the core PCE inflation measure that the Fed watches most closely (Chart 2). Geopolitics will dominate the headlines over the next six weeks, with the waiver on Iran sanctions expiring on May 12, the end of the 60-day consultation for U.S. tariffs on China on May 21, the possible imposition of tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese goods starting on June 4, and likely developments with North Korea and NAFTA. Recommended Allocation Chart 1Global Growth Has Slowed Chart 2...And Inflation Picked Up Investors inclined to make short-term tactical shifts might, therefore, want to reduce risk over the next one to three months. For most clients of the Global Asset Allocation service with a longer perspective, however, we continue to recommend an overweight on equities and other risk assets. In the U.S., in particular, fiscal stimulus will, according to IMF estimates, boost GDP growth by 0.8 percentage points this year and 0.9 percentage points next (Chart 3). U.S. corporate earnings should grow by almost 20% this year and around 12% next and, while this is already in analysts' forecasts, it is hard to imagine equity markets struggling against such a strong backdrop. Not one of the recession/bear market warning signals we are watching (inverted yield curve, rising credit spreads, Fed policy in restrictive territory, significant decline in PMIs, peak in cyclical spending) is yet flashing. Neither do we see any signs that higher interest rates or expensive energy prices are slowing growth. Lead indicators of capex have come off a little, but still point to robust growth (Chart 4). The housing market tends to be the most vulnerable to rising rates and the average rate on a 30-year U.S. fixed mortgage has risen to 4.5% (from 3.7% at the start of the year and a low of 3.3% in late 2016). But housing data still look strong, with a continued rise in house prices and mortgage applications steady (Chart 5). Perhaps the sector most vulnerable to rising U.S. rates in this cycle is emerging markets, where borrowers have grown foreign-currency debt to $3.2 trillion, according to the BIS - one reason for our longstanding caution on EM assets (Chart 6). With crude oil rising to $75 a barrel, U.S. retail gasoline prices now average $2.80 a gallon, up from below $2 in 2016, and transportation companies are complaining of rising costs. But, historically, oil prices have needed to rise by 100% YoY before they triggered recession (Chart 7). Chart 3U.S. Stimulus Will Boost The Economy Chart 4Capex Remains Robust Chart 5No Signs Of Higher Rates Hurting Housing Chart 6Could EM Be Most Affected By Higher Rates? Chart 7Oil Hasn't Risen Enough To Cause Recession Eventually, however, strong growth, especially in the U.S., will become a headwind for risk assets. There is still some slack in the labor market, with another 500,000 people likely to return to work eventually (Chart 8). When that happens, perhaps early next year, the currently sluggish wage growth will begin to accelerate. Fiscal stimulus is likely to prove inflationary, since it is unprecedented for a government to stimulate the economy so aggressively when it is already close to full capacity (Chart 9). These factors will push inflation expectations back to their equilibrium level, and the market will then need to adjust to the Fed accelerating the pace of rate hikes to choke off inflation, which will push up real bond yields (Chart 10). Chart 8Still 500,000 Who Could Return To Work Chart 9Stimulus Unprecedented In Such A Strong Economy Chart 10Eventually Real Rates Will Need To Rise When that starts to happen - perhaps late this year or early next year - the yield curve will invert, and investors will start to price in the next recession. That will be the time to turn defensive, but it is still too early now. Fixed Income: Markets are currently pricing only a 50% probability of three more Fed hikes this year, and only two hikes next year. As markets start to anticipate further tightening, long rates are also likely to rise (Chart 11). We see 10-year U.S. Treasury yields at 3.3-3.5% by year-end, and so recommend an overweight in TIPs and a short duration position. The ECB is unlikely to need to rush rate hikes, however, given the slack in the euro zone (Chart 12), and so the spread between U.S. and core euro yields should widen further. Corporate credit spreads are unlikely to contract further but, as long as growth continues, we see U.S. high-yield bonds, in particular, providing attractive returns within the fixed-income bucket. Our bond strategists find that between the 2/10 yield curve crossing below 50 BP and its inverting, high-yield debt has since 1980 given an annualized 368 BP of excess return.1 Chart 11Fed Expectations Drive Long Rates Chart 12Still Plenty Of Slack In The Euro Zone Equities: Our preference remains for developed equities over emerging, and for more cyclical, higher-beta markets such as euro zone and Japan. The risk of a stronger yen over the coming months is a concern for Japanese equities in local currency terms but, as our recommendations are expressed in U.S. dollars, the currency effect cancels out, and so we keep our overweight for now. At this stage of the cycle our preference is for value stocks (especially financials) over growth stocks (especially IT): value/growth usually performs in line with cyclicals/defensives, but the relationship has moved out of sync in the past year or so (Chart 13), mostly because of the performance of internet stocks, whose premium valuation makes them very vulnerable to any bad news. Currencies: A widening of interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and euro zone is likely to push down the euro against the U.S. dollar over the next few months, especially given how crowded the long-euro trade has become. The vulnerability of EM currencies to rising U.S. rates has been seen in the past few weeks, with sharp falls in currencies such as the Turkish lira, Brazilian real, and Russian ruble. We expect this to continue. Overall, we expect a moderate appreciation of the trade-weighted U.S. dollar over the next 12 months. Commodities: The crude oil price continues to rise in line with our forecasts, and we expect to see Brent crude above $80 a barrel before the end of the year. The price next year will depend on whether the OPEC agreement is extended, and how much U.S. shale oil production reacts to the higher price. On the assumption of a moderate increase in supply from both OPEC and the U.S., the crude price is likely to fall back moderately in 2019. We see the long-term equilibrium crude price in the $55-65 range, the level where global supply can be increased enough to satisfy around 1.5% annual growth in demand. We remain more cautious on industrial commodities, and see the first signs coming through of a slowdown in China, which will dent demand (Chart 14). Chart 13Value Stocks Look Attractive Chart 14Signs Of China Slowing Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "As Good As It Gets For Corporate Debt," dated 24 April, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights Bond Bear Market: TIPS breakeven inflation rates are still below target, and this gives us high conviction that Treasury yields will increase on a cyclical horizon. If we assume that the equilibrium fed funds rate is approximately 3%, then the cyclical peak for the 10-year Treasury yield will likely occur between 3.35% and 3.52%. Interest Sensitive Spending: The robust performance of the cyclical sectors of the economy suggests that monetary policy remains accommodative. When growth in these interest rate-sensitive sectors starts to slow it will be a good signal that we are approaching the cyclical peak in Treasury yields. Bond Yields & Gold: A breakout to a significantly higher gold price could signal that the equilibrium fed funds rate needs to be revised up, suggesting a much higher cyclical peak for Treasury yields. Feature Chart 1The Bear Is Back After a brief pause in March, the cyclical bond bear market has resumed. The 10-year Treasury yield even briefly broke above 3% last week, with its 27 basis point rise off the early-April lows evenly split between the compensation for inflation protection and the 10-year real yield (Chart 1). To mark the occasion of the 10-year Treasury yield breaking above 3% for the first time since early 2014, this week we update our roadmap for the Two-Stage Cyclical Bond Bear Market, which we first outlined in late February.1 Specifically, we consider the questions of where the 10-year Treasury yield might be by the end of this year, and where it might ultimately peak for the cycle. On the second question we think bond investors can glean important information from trends in the price of gold. Tracking The Two-Stage Bear Market In our report from February we described how the cyclical Treasury bear market will proceed in two stages. The first stage is characterized by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations. Stage 1: The Re-Anchoring Of Inflation Expectations The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently sit at 2.17% and 2.25%, respectively. Historically, when core inflation is well anchored around the Fed's target, both of those breakeven rates have traded in a range between 2.3% and 2.5% (Chart 2). This means that nominal Treasury yields still have room to rise as the market prices in a more realistic outlook for inflation. That could happen sooner rather than later. Core PCE inflation increased 0.15% in March, causing the 12-month rate of change to jump from 1.57% to 1.88% (Chart 2, bottom panel). Meanwhile, the annualized 3-month and 6-month rates of change remain well above the Fed's 2% target. Looking further out, we see inflationary pressures continuing to build in the U.S. economy. The employment data now clearly show very little slack in the labor market, and this appears to be finally filtering through to wages. The Employment Cost Index for Wages & Salaries rose 0.9% in the first quarter, its largest quarterly increase since 2007. The year-over-year growth rate in the index moved up to 2.7%, from 2.6% in Q4, and is right in line with its predicted value based on the prime age employment-to-population ratio (Chart 3).2 Chart 2Stage 1 Almost Complete Chart 3Faster Wage Growth Ahead As long as TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below our target range we have high conviction that Treasury yields will increase, driven by a re-anchoring of inflation expectations. Once our TIPS breakeven target is met, the cyclical bond bear market will transition to stage two. Stage 2: The Terminal Fed Funds Rate After inflation expectations are re-anchored around the Fed's target, the most important question for bond investors becomes: How high will the Fed need to lift the policy rate to keep inflation from moving well above target? Or alternatively: What is the terminal (or peak) fed funds rate for this cycle (see Box)? Box: The Terminal Fed Funds Rate & The Equilibrium Fed Funds Rate Please note that in this report we refer to two separate, though related, concepts. We define the terminal fed funds rate as the peak fed funds rate for the business cycle. We also define the equilibrium fed funds rate as the fed funds rate that is consistent with neither an accommodative nor a restrictive monetary policy. The terminal fed funds rate is almost certainly higher than the equilibrium fed funds rate because monetary policy will likely turn restrictive before the end of the economic cycle. Chart 4Treasury Yield Models We can show why this question is so important using a simple model of Treasury yields based on expectations for changes in the fed funds rate and the MOVE index of implied rate volatility. The latter is a proxy for the term premium embedded in Treasury yields (Chart 4). For example, if we assume that the equilibrium fed funds rate - the rate consistent with neither accommodative nor restrictive monetary policy - is approximately 3%, and that by the end of this year the yield curve will price in a return to neutral monetary policy by the end of 2019. That would be consistent with a 10-year Treasury yield between 3.03% and 3.19% by the end of this year, assuming also that the MOVE index ranges between its current level and its historical low. This result can be seen in Table 1 by looking at the rows consistent with three rate hikes in 2018 and a 12-month discounter of 75 bps by year end. We could also assume that the equilibrium fed funds rate is 3%, but that the market will start to price in a restrictive monetary policy by the end of 2019 - i.e. a fed funds rate above its equilibrium level. That result would be consistent with a 10-year Treasury yield between 3.35% and 3.52% by the end of this year, once again assuming that the MOVE index ranges between its current level and its historical low. The bottom line is that with TIPS breakeven inflation rates still below target, we have high conviction that yields will increase on a cyclical horizon. Beyond that, if we assume that a 3% fed funds rate is roughly consistent with a neutral monetary policy stance, then we should expect the cyclical peak in the 10-year Treasury yield to be in a range between 3.35% and 3.52%. Tracking The Equilibrium Fed Funds Rate Using Nominal GDP And Gold It's worth pointing out that both examples in the prior section assumed that the MOVE index will either stay flat or decline. The reason for that assumption is that both examples assume a relatively low equilibrium fed funds rate of 3%. In other words, both examples assume that monetary policy will turn restrictive once the fed funds rate moves above 3%, causing economic growth to slow. If that assumption proves to be correct, and with the 10-year Treasury yield already close to 3%, the yield curve will undoubtedly flatten as the fed funds rate is raised. A flatter yield curve is highly correlated with lower implied rate volatility. In order for implied rate volatility to move meaningfully higher, and for us to see a much higher 10-year Treasury yield (as is shown in the bottom third of Table 1), the market will need to start discounting a higher equilibrium fed funds rate. Put differently, investors would have to believe that the fed funds rate necessary to slow economic growth and inflation is much higher than 3%. It is only in that scenario that the cyclical peak for the 10-year Treasury yield will significantly exceed the 3.35% to 3.52% range posited in the prior section. Table 1Treasury Yield Projections Under Different Scenarios But how can we decide whether or not the equilibrium fed funds rate is higher than 3%? One imperfect way is to simply track economic growth and look for signs that it is about to slow. Cyclical Nominal GDP Growth Chart 5 shows that one good signal of a recession is when nominal GDP growth falls below the fed funds rate. While this is a fairly reliable recession indicator, it is not always a good method for determining when monetary policy turns restrictive. For example, prior to the last recession nominal GDP growth started to wane when it was still far above the level of the fed funds rate. If we had been waiting for the fed funds rate to exceed nominal GDP growth we would have missed the inflection point toward slower growth. The method worked better prior to the 1990 recession when the fed funds rate was lifted above the pace of nominal GDP growth while the latter was still accelerating. That configuration gave a much clearer real-time signal of restrictive monetary policy. Chart 5Cyclical Spending Suggests That Monetary Policy Remains Accommodative A more refined version of this approach is to track only the cyclical sectors of the economy - those sectors that are most sensitive to interest rates. Growth in those sectors - consumer spending on durable goods, residential investment and nonresidential investment for equipment and software - tends to deteriorate prior to major downturns in overall nominal GDP (Chart 5, bottom panel). This method gives us a slightly earlier warning that monetary policy has turned restrictive. On that note, we observe that while cyclical spending as a percent of overall GDP is still in an uptrend, its rate of increase has declined during the past few quarters (Chart 6). This is mostly due to somewhat weaker consumer spending on durables. But we doubt that cyclical spending is in danger of rolling over any time soon. Chart 7 shows that the fundamentals underpinning the key cyclical sectors of the economy remain robust: Consumer sentiment is elevated compared to history, and income growth has started to move higher (Chart 7, top panel). The latter will be helped along by recently enacted tax cuts during the next few months. New orders for core durable goods already display solid growth, and survey indicators give no signal of imminent deterioration (Chart 7, panel 2). On residential investment, homebuilder confidence is near historical highs (Chart 7, panel 3), while mortgage purchase applications so far seem immune from the effects of higher interest rates (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 6Cyclical Spending Still Rising... Chart 7...And Fundamentals Remain Sound At the moment, this analysis tells us that monetary policy is probably still accommodative. Once the cyclical sectors of the economy start to slow, that will give us a signal that monetary policy is restrictive and that we are probably near the cyclical peak in Treasury yields. Inflation, Uncertainty And The Price Of Gold But is there another method we can use to track the equilibrium fed funds rate and the stance of monetary policy in real time? We think there is, and it relates to investors' perceptions of inflationary pressures in the economy. First, we recognize that when inflationary pressures are higher, the equilibrium fed funds rate is also higher. In other words, the Fed needs to lift rates further before monetary policy becomes restrictive and inflation starts to flag. This intuition is confirmed by the historical relationship between long-run inflation forecasts and the short-term interest rate (Chart 8). More interestingly, we also observe that uncertainty about the long-run inflation forecast is positively related to implied interest rate volatility, the slope of the yield curve and the price of gold (Chart 9). Once again, this is intuitive. If investors are more uncertain about the long-run inflation outlook they will demand a greater risk premium to bear inflation risk in the long-run, thus driving long-dated bond yields higher. Chart 8Inflation Forecasts &##br## Interest Rates Chart 9Inflation Uncertainty Drives##br## The Term Premium The gold price is positively correlated with inflation uncertainty because gold is in many ways the "anti-Fed" asset. Since it is perceived to be a long-run store of value, investors will bid up the gold price whenever there is a heightened risk that the Fed might "fall behind the curve" allowing inflation to overshoot its target. Conversely, the gold price tends to fall when the perception is that the Fed is "ahead of the curve" and is maintaining an overly restrictive monetary policy. Chart 10Gold Has Led The Fed This is why bond investors would be wise to heed the signal from gold. A sharply rising gold price signals that the fed funds rate is running further below its equilibrium level. This could occur because the Fed is cutting rates to levels that the market deems too low. Or, it could occur because the market now believes that the equilibrium fed funds rate is higher. A sharply falling gold price gives the exact opposite signal. It tells us that either the Fed is lifting the funds rate too far above equilibrium, or that the market is revising down its assessment of the equilibrium rate. This chain of events played out before our eyes during the past few years. The gold price started to fall sharply in early 2013, and continued its decline until late 2015 (Chart 10). A signal that investors were discounting a more restrictive monetary policy stance during that timeframe. But the Fed was not lifting rates during that period. In fact, with hindsight it now seems obvious that the gold price was falling because the market was revising down its assessment of the equilibrium fed funds rate. Investors should also note that the falling gold price signaled a lower equilibrium fed funds rate well before the Fed started to revise down its median forecast for the interest rate that is expected to prevail in the "longer run".3 Tracking the price of gold would have given us a much timelier signal than waiting for the Fed. Chart 10 also shows that the gold price has rebounded since early 2016, but has been confined to a trading range during the past few months. Not coincidentally, this rebound has coincided with the Fed ceasing the downward revisions to its estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate. Going forward, we think that bond investors would be wise to closely track the price of gold. A significant move higher in the gold price would be a strong signal that the Fed is not tightening policy quickly enough to contain inflationary pressures. In other words, it would signal that the equilibrium fed funds rate should be revised higher. This would drive up implied interest rate volatility, apply steepening pressure to the yield curve, and lead to a higher end-of-cycle target for the 10-year Treasury yield. Bottom Line: The robust performance of the cyclical sectors of the economy suggests that monetary policy remains accommodative. When growth in these interest rate-sensitive sectors starts to slow it will be a good signal that we are approaching the cyclical peak in Treasury yields. Bond investors should also track the price of gold. A breakout to a significantly higher gold price could signal that the equilibrium fed funds rate needs to be revised up, suggesting a much higher cyclical peak for Treasury yields. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 208, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 In a recent report we showed that nonfarm payrolls need to increase by 110k or more per month to drive the prime age employment-to-population rate higher, leading to faster wage growth. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Review", dated April 10, 018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The Fed's projection of the interest rate expected to prevail in the "longer run" is essentially its estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Reviving global machinery end-demand alongside a global capex upcycle, are the key pillars of our high-conviction overweight call in the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck index. The current macro backdrop is unforgiving for defensive insurance stocks. Leading indicators of pricing power warn that softening prices coupled with expanding headcount will weigh on insurance profits in the coming quarters. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities moved laterally last week and continued to consolidate the early-February tremor, unimpressed by better than expected profit growth across the board. The SPX has been oscillating in a 10% range over the past three months and has been a trader's (and bank's) paradise. There are high odds that this trading range will stay in place and the market will churn until the summer before breaking out (Chart 1). Chart 1Breakout Looming? Nevertheless, the anemic equity market response to solid earnings is slightly unnerving. Soft EPS guidance and perky input cost inflation are two thorny issues revealed this earnings season. With that in mind, we have identified three key brewing equity market headwinds: EPS growth deceleration toward 10%. Rising interest rates. U.S. dollar reflex rebound. Chart 2Monitoring The Correlation 20% profit growth is this cycle's peak rate, and we have been flagging in recent research1 that, beneath the surface, investors are slowly starting to revise expectations lower toward the 10% growth projection for calendar 2019 EPS. Simultaneously, interest rates continue their ascent and may cause some consternation in stocks. Not only does a higher discount rate weigh on valuations, but also the Fed's tightening cycle will eventually slam the brakes on the economy, with housing and the consumer feeling the higher interest rate knock-on effects most intensely. As we highlighted recently,2 we are closely monitoring the correlation between stocks and the 10-year Treasury yield and looking out for a collapse into negative territory to signal an economic (and market) choke point (Chart 2). Finally, recent ECB and BoJ chatter of easy monetary policies for as far as the eye can see, may have put a floor on the greenback, at least temporarily, with the Fed going it alone and lifting the fed funds rate into 2019 and beyond. While all three headwinds suggest that the market may have trouble breaking out of its funk in the next few months, on a cyclical 9-12 month horizon we remain upbeat on equity return prospects. Any U.S. dollar advance is likely a bear market rally and will take time to filter negatively through to earnings. Rising interest rates are also a consequence of higher economic growth which is a positive, i.e. real rates are rising alongside inflation expectations. And, if the SPX attains 10% EPS growth in 2019 as we expect, that is an above trend EPS growth rate and twice as high as nominal GDP growth, an impressive feat at this stage of the cycle. This week we are updating our SPX target to 3,200. We first came up with our SPX end-of-cycle target last July using three different methods:3 a traditional dividend discount model (DDM), EPS and multiple sensitivity analysis and forward equilibrium equity risk premium (ERP) analysis. As a reminder, this 3,200 SPX level is a peak number before the next recession hits and Table 2 summarizes our updated results (if you would like to receive the excel spreadsheet with the three models so you can tweak our inputs/assumptions please click here). In our DDM, our discount rate assumptions remain intact and very conservative. We use an up-to-date annual dividend per share number and back out dividends in U.S. dollars via the updated SPX divisor and make a conservative assumption of no buybacks in the coming years. The recession-related 10% dividend cut has moved to 2020, in line with BCA's view. Finally, we rolled over our estimates to 2023 resulting in a roughly 3,200 SPX peak value estimate. Our EPS and multiple sensitivity analysis starting point is $191 EPS in 2020 (this is in line with the sell-side bottom up estimate according to IBES data) and a 16.5 multiple. That equates to an SPX ending value of near 3200. Table 2SPX Target Using Three Different Methods With regard to the ERP analysis (Chart 3), our forward ERP equilibrium remains at 200bps. 2020 EPS come in at $191, and we also pencil in 100bps selloff in the bond market, resulting in an SPX 3,200 estimate. Chart 3ERP Has Room To Fall This week we are updating a high-conviction overweight call in a deep cyclical index, and reiterate a below benchmark allocation in a financials sub-index. The CAT Is Roaring, Is The Market Listening? Early last October we upgraded the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck (CMHT) index to overweight, and two months later we added it to the high-conviction overweight call list. On January 29th, right after the broad market hit its all-time highs, we managed to book impressive 10% relative gains as we introduced a risk management tool and instituted trailing stops to the high-conviction calls that cleared the 10% relative return mark. Subsequently, we reinstated the S&P CMHT index to the high-conviction overweight call list, at a deflated price point, as our constructive cyclical backdrop never wavered. Currently, our thesis remains intact: reviving global machinery end-demand alongside a global capex upcycle are a harbinger of sustained profit outperformance. While some leading indicators of global growth have recently crested, global output will remain brisk and above trend. When global growth is expanding, machinery demand typically demonstrates its high beta characteristics. Our global machinery exports proxy is firing on all cylinders rising to multi-year highs and sell side analysts have taken notice: S&P CMHT net earnings revisions are as good as they get (bottom panel, Chart 4). Encouragingly, the softening dollar suggests that U.S. exports have the upper hand and are grabbing market share. BCA's global machinery new orders proxy corroborates the trade data and underscores that machinery profits will overwhelm (middle panel, Chart 4). Dissecting global machinery demand is revealing. Importantly, previously moribund Chinese loan demand has reversed course and is now gaining traction. Tack on the recent steep fall in interest rates and factors are falling into place for a durable pick up in Chinese machinery consumption. Indeed, hypersensitive Chinese excavator sales continue to expand at a breakneck pace (Chart 5). Elsewhere in Asia, highly-cyclical Japanese machine tool orders likewise defy gravity vaulting to fresh all-time highs (Chart 5). The commodity complex also confirms the enticing global machinery end-demand backdrop. The broad commodity index in general and crude oil prices in particular have been reaccelerating of late. The energy space is a key end-customer for the machinery industry and $75/bbl global oil prices have reignited a fresh drilling cycle (Chart 6). Chart 4Global Machinery End-Demand Is Upbeat... Chart 5...And Asia Is Leading The Pack Chart 6Commodities Give The All Clear Sign Even the U.S. machinery demand backdrop is vibrant. The V-shaped recovery in U.S. machinery order books remains intact. Fiscal easing is reviving animal spirits and CEOs are voting with their feet: overall capital outlays are rising at a healthy clip, positively contributing to GDP growth, with machinery fixed capital formation growth recently clearing the 20%/annum hurdle (Chart 7). Capex intentions according to the regional Fed surveys are also holding near recent cyclical highs, and were Congress to pass an infrastructure bill that would be an additional boon to machinery top and bottom line growth (Chart 7). On the domestic operating front, machinery factories are humming and given that capacity is contracting, the industry is regaining its pricing power footing (Chart 8). The upshot is that this high-operating leverage industry should continue to enjoy outsized profit gains. Chart 7Even U.S. Machinery Demand Is Firming Chart 8Operating Metrics Flashing Green Nevertheless, there are two key risks to our otherwise bullish machinery thesis that we are closely monitoring. First, input costs are on the rise both in terms of labor and raw commodities (bottom panel, Chart 9). If the industry fails to pass this input cost inflation down the supply chain, then a margin squeeze is likely. Second, and most importantly, a hard landing in China would put our constructive machinery view offside, but we assign low odds to a gap down in Chinese economic activity (middle panel, Chart 9). Finally, given the recent consolidation phase, the S&P CMHT index has a valuation cushion as per the neutral reading in our relative valuation indicator. Similarly overbought conditions have been worked out and our technical indicator is also hovering near the neutral zone offering a compelling entry point to commit fresh capital (Chart 10). Chart 9Two Risks To Bullish View Chart 10Compelling Entry Point Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight call in the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CSTF - CAT, CMI, PCAR. Insurance Expiry Notice While we continue to recommend a core portfolio overweight in the S&P financials index via the banks (high-conviction), asset managers and investment banks sub-indexes, the S&P insurance index remains our sole underweight. Unlike its financials brethren, the insurance industry is defensive rather than cyclical and thrives when the economy is slowing. Fairly stable, recurring and, most of the time, predictable revenue streams are sought after attributes when economic growth is scarce. Currently, the U.S. and global economies are expanding above trend, the global capex upcycle is running at full steam and CEOs and consumers alike exude confidence. Under such a backdrop, investors have historically avoided insurance equities. Chart 11 drives this point home. Over the past four decades the greenback and relative share prices have been positively correlated. The U.S. dollar peaked in December 2016 and since then it has been goosing global output, and simultaneously weighing on insurance stocks. Similarly, a rising 10-year Treasury yield reflecting improving economic growth also anchors insurance stocks (10-year Treasury yield shown inverted, Chart 12). While higher interest rates are positive for investment portfolio income, they also imply mark-to-market losses on bond portfolios. Higher interest rates also incent insurers to underwrite at a faster pace with more lenient standards, which is often a precursor to increased competition and diminishing pricing power, eventually sapping profits. Chart 11Insurance Is Defensive Chart 12Higher Yields Hurt More Than Help On the pricing front, there seems to be a bifurcated market. Auto insurance pricing is hardening, but home insurance is moving in the opposite direction (Chart 13). The slingshot recovery in auto loans versus residential real estate loans partially explains the big delta in pricing as subprime auto loans excesses have, at the margin, boosted new and used vehicle sales. This is not sustainable and there are high odds that this extra demand will level off in the coming months as the subprime auto credit screws inevitably tighten, eventually dampening car insurance prices. Worrisomely, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey revealed that not only is demand for auto loans waning, but also bankers are no longer willing extenders of auto related credit. Taken together, momentum in housing and auto sales is nil, warning that insurance top line growth will trail the broad market (Chart 14). Unsurprisingly, relative consumer outlays on insurance remain moribund, and a far cry from the previous cyclical peak, warning that it is premature to expect a valuation re-rating (second panel, Chart 15). Chart 13Margin Trouble? Chart 14Softening Demand Chart 15Insurance Indicator Message: Shy Away With regard to input costs, insurance labor additions continue unabated, trumping overall non-farm payrolls and the broad financial services industry since the GFC trough. Our insurance wage bill proxy is closing in on 4%/annum (bottom panel, Chart 13), warning that a margin squeeze looms. Our Insurance Indicator does an excellent job encapsulating all of these different signals and has recently taken a turn for the worse (third panel, Chart 15), underscoring that the path of least resistance is lower for relative share prices in the coming months. Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight stance in the S&P insurance index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INSU - AIG, CB, MET, MMC, PRU, TRV, AFL, AON, ALL, PGR, WLTW, HIG, PFG, L, CINF, LNC, XL, AJG, UNM, TMK, AIZ, RE, BHF. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Bumpier Ride," dated March 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Reflective Or Restrictive?" dated March 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "SPX 3,000?" dated July 10, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert)
Highlights Global equities are poised for a "blow-off" rally over the next 12-to-18 months. Long-term return prospects, however, are poor. The final innings of the 1991-2001 economic expansion saw a violent rotation in favor of value stocks and euro area equities. We expect history to repeat itself. After sagging by as much as 7% in the second half of 1998 and going nowhere in 1999, the dollar rose by 13% between January 2000 and February 2002. The greenback today is similarly ripe for a second wind. The correlation between the dollar and oil prices was fairly weak in the late 1990s. The correlation is likely to weaken again now that U.S. crude imports have fallen by about 70% from their 2006 highs thanks to the shale boom. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield peaked at 6.79% in January 2000. Thus far, there is scant evidence that the recent increase in bond yields is having a major effect on either U.S. capital spending or housing demand. This suggests yields can go higher before they enter restrictive territory. Feature Learning From The Past The theme of this year's BCA annual Investment Conference - which will be held in Toronto in September and will feature a keynote address by Janet L. Yellen - is, appropriately enough, entitled "Investing In A Late-Cycle Economy."1 In the spirit of our conference, this week's report looks back at the market environment at the tail end of the 1991-2001 expansion in order to distill some lessons for today. The mid-to-late 1990s was a tale of contrasts. The U.S. was thriving, spurred on by accelerating productivity growth, falling inflation, and a massive corporate capex boom. Southern Europe was also doing well, aided by falling interest rates and optimism about the coming introduction of the euro. On the flipside, Germany - dubbed by many pundits at the time as the sick man of Europe - was still coping with the hangover from reunification. Japan was mired in deflation. Emerging markets were melting down, starting with the Mexican peso crisis in late 1994, followed by the Asian crisis, and finally the Russian default. In the financial world, the following points are worth highlighting (Chart 1): Chart 1AFinancial Markets In The Late 1990s (I) Chart 1BFinancial Markets In The Late 1990s (II) Russia's default and the implosion of Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) led to a gut-wrenching 22% decline in the S&P 500 in the late summer and early fall of 1998. This was followed by a colossal 68% blow-off rally over the subsequent 18 months. The collapse of LTCM marked the low point for EM assets for the cycle. The combination of cheap currencies, rising commodity prices, and a newfound resolve to enact structural reforms paved the way for a major EM boom over the following decade. The VIX and credit spreads trended upwards during the late 1990s, even as U.S. stocks climbed higher. Rising equity volatility and wider spreads were partly a reaction to problems abroad. However, they also reflected the deterioration in U.S. corporate health and heightened fears that stock market valuations had reached unsustainable levels. The U.S. stock market peaked in March 2000. However, that was only because the tech bubble burst. Outside of the technology sector, the S&P 500 actually increased by 9.2% between March 2000 and May 2001. Value stocks finally began to outperform growth stocks in 2000, joining small caps, which had begun to outperform a year earlier. European equities also surged towards the end of the bull market, outpacing the U.S. by 34% in local-currency terms and 21% in dollar terms between July 1999 and March 2000. The strong U.S. economy during the late 1990s ushered in a prolonged period of dollar appreciation that lasted until February 2002. That said, the greenback did not rise in a straight line. The dollar fell by as much as 7% in the second half of 1998 as the Fed cut rates in response to the LTCM crisis. It went sideways in 1999 before resuming its upward trend in early 2000. The correlation between the dollar and oil prices was much weaker in the 1990s compared to the first 15 years of the new millennium. After falling from a high of 6.98% in April 1997 to 4.16% in October 1998, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield rose to 6.79% in January 2000. The Fed would keep raising rates until May of that year. The recession began in March 2001. Now And Then Just as in the tail end of the 1990s expansion, the global economy is doing reasonably well these days. Growth has cooled over the past few months, but should remain comfortably above trend for the remainder of the year. After struggling in 2014-16, Emerging Markets are on the mend, thanks in part to the rebound in commodity prices. During the 1990s cycle, the U.S. was the first major economy to reach full employment. The same is true today. The headline unemployment rate has fallen to 4.1%, just shy of the 2000 low of 3.8%. The share of the working-age population out of the labor market but wanting a job is back to pre-recession levels. The same goes for the share of unemployed workers who have quit - rather than lost - their jobs (Chart 2). One key difference concerns fiscal policy. The U.S. federal budget was in great shape in 2000. The same cannot be said today. Chart 3 shows that the fiscal deficit currently stands at 3.5% of GDP. The deficit is on track to deteriorate to 4.9% of GDP in 2021 even if growth remains strong. Federal government debt held by the public is also set to rise to 83.1% of GDP in 2021, up from 33.6% of GDP in 2000. Unlike in the past, the U.S. government will have less scope to ease fiscal policy when the next recession rolls around. Chart 2An Economy At Full Employment Chart 3The U.S. Budget Deficit Is Set To Widen Even If The Unemployment Rate Continues To Decline Further Upside For Global Bond Yields Deleveraging headwinds, excess spare capacity, slow potential GDP growth, and chronically low inflation have all conspired to keep a lid on global bond yields. That is starting to change. Credit growth has accelerated, while output gaps have shrunk. The structural outlook for productivity growth is weaker than it was in the 1990s, but a cyclical pickup is likely given the recent recovery in capital spending. Chart 4 shows that there is a reasonably strong correlation between business capex and productivity growth. On the inflation side, the 3-month annualized change in U.S. core CPI and core PCE has reached 2.9% and 2.8%, respectively. The prices paid component of the ISM manufacturing index hit a seven-year high in March. The New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge has zoomed to 3.1% (Chart 5). The market has been slow to price in the prospect of higher U.S. inflation (Chart 6). The TIPS 10-year breakeven rate is still roughly 20 bps below where it traded in the pre-recession period, even though the unemployment rate is lower now than at any point during that cycle. As long-term inflation expectations reset higher, bond yields will rise. Higher inflation expectations will also push up the term premium, which remains in negative territory. Chart 4Pickup In Capex Brightens ##br##The Cyclical Productivity Outlook Chart 5Inflation##br## Is Coming... Chart 6...Which Could Take ##br##Bond Yields Higher The upward pressure on yields could be amplified if the market revises up its assessment of the terminal real rate. Perhaps in a nod to what is to come, the Fed revised its terminal fed funds projection from 2.8% to 2.9% in the March 2018 Summary of Economic Projections. However, this is still well below the median estimate of 4.3% shown in the inaugural dot plot in January 2012. The U.S. Economy Is Not Yet Succumbing To Higher Rates For now, there is little evidence that higher rates are having a major negative effect on the economy. Business capital spending has decelerated recently, but that appears to be a global phenomenon. Capex has weakened even more in Japan, where yields have barely moved. In any case, the slowdown in U.S. investment spending has been fairly modest. Core capital goods orders disappointed in March, but are still up 7% year-over-year. Likewise, while our capex intention survey indicator has ticked lower, it remains well above its historic average. And despite elevated corporate debt levels, high-yield credit spreads are subdued and banks continue to ease lending standards for commercial and industrial loans (Chart 7). In the household realm, delinquency rates are rising and lending standards are tightening for auto and credit card loans. However, this has more to do with excessively strong lending growth over the preceding few years than with higher interest rates. Particularly in the case of credit card lending, even large movements in the fed funds rate tend to translate into only modest percent changes in debt service payments because of the large spreads that lenders charge on unsecured loans. The financial obligation ratio - a measure of the debt service burden for the average household - is rising but is still close to the lowest levels in three decades. Mortgage debt, which accounts for about two-thirds of all household credit, is near a 16-year low as a share of disposable income (Chart 8). As Ed Leamer perceptively argued in his 2007 Jackson Hole address entitled "Housing Is The Business Cycle," housing is the main avenue by which monetary policy affects the real economy.2 Similar to business capital spending, while the housing data has leveled off to some extent, it still looks pretty good: Building permits and housing starts continue to rise. New and existing home sales rebounded in March. Home prices have accelerated. The S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Index saw its strongest month-over-month gain in February since 2005. The MBA Mortgage Applications Purchase Index is up 11% year-over-year. The percentage of households looking to buy a home in the next six months is at a cycle high. Homebuilder sentiment has dipped slightly, but it remains at rock-solid levels (Chart 9). Chart 7Capital Spending ##br##Still Quite Robust Chart 8Household Debt Load And Financial Obligations##br## Are At Pre-Housing Bubble Levels Chart 9The Housing Sector##br## Is Doing Fine Fixed-Income: Hedged Or Unhedged? Bond positioning is quite short, so a temporary dip in yields is probable. However, investors should expect bond yields to rise more than is currently discounted over the next 12 months. BCA's fixed income strategists favor cyclically underweighting the U.S., Canada, and core Europe, while overweighting Australia, the U.K., and Japan in currency-hedged terms. Table 1 shows that the hedged yield on U.S. 10-year Treasurys is only 20 bps in EUR terms, and 38 bps in yen terms. Table 1Global Bond Yields: Hedged And Unhedged The low level of hedged U.S. yields today means that Treasurys are unlikely to enjoy the same inflows as in the past from overseas investors. This could push yields higher than they otherwise would go. To gain the significant yield advantage that U.S. government debt now commands, investors would need to go long Treasurys on a currency-unhedged basis. For long-term investors, this is a tantalizing investment. The current spread between 30-year Treasurys and German bunds stands at 192 bps. The euro would have to appreciate to 2.15 against the dollar for buy-and-hold investors to lose money by going long Treasurys relative to bunds.3 Such an overshoot of the euro is unlikely to occur, especially since the structural problems haunting Europe are no less daunting than those facing the United States. A Pop In The Dollar? Admittedly, the near-term success of a strategy that buys Treasurys, currency-unhedged, will hinge on what happens to the dollar. As occurred at the turn of the millennium, the dollar could find a bid as the Fed is forced to raise rates more aggressively than the market is pricing in. In this regard, large-scale U.S. fiscal stimulus, while arguably bearish for the dollar over the long haul, could be bullish for the dollar in the near term. My colleague Jennifer Lacombe has observed that flows into U.S.-listed European equity ETFs, such as those offered by iShares (EZU) and Vanguard (VGK), have reliably led the euro-dollar exchange rate by about six months (Chart 10).4 Recent outflows from these funds augur poorly for the euro. Rising hedging costs could also prompt more investors to buy U.S. fixed-income assets currency-unhedged, which would raise the demand for dollars (Chart 11).5 Chart 10ETF Flows Point To Lower EUR/USD Chart 11The Dollar Could Bounce The Oil-Dollar Correlation May Be Weakening Investors are accustomed to thinking that the dollar tends to be inversely correlated with oil prices. That relationship has not always been in place. Brent bottomed at just over $9/bbl in December 1998. Crude prices tripled over the subsequent 20 months. The broad trade-weighted dollar actually rose by 5% over that period. The dollar has strengthened by 2.8% since hitting a low on September 8, 2017, while Brent has gained 37% over this period. This breakdown in the dollar-oil correlation harkens back to late 2016: Brent rose by 26% between the U.S. presidential election and the end of that year. The dollar appreciated by 4% during those months. We are not ready to abandon the view that a stronger dollar is generally bad news for oil prices. However, the relationship between the two variables seems to be fading. Chart 12 shows that the two-year rolling correlation coefficient of monthly returns for Brent crude and the broad trade-weighted dollar has weakened in recent years. Chart 12The Negative Dollar-Oil Correlation Has Weakened This is not too surprising. Thanks to the shale boom, U.S. oil imports have fallen by about 70% since 2006 (Chart 13). This has made the U.S. trade balance less sensitive to changes in oil prices. The recent surge in oil prices has also been strengthened by OPEC 2.0's decision to reduce the supply of crude hitting the market, ongoing turmoil in Venezuela, and the possibility that Iranian sanctions could take 0.3-0.8 million barrels a day off the market. A reduction in oil supply is bad for global growth at the margin. However, weaker global growth is good for the dollar (Chart 14). OPEC's production cuts also increase the scope for U.S. shale producers to gain global market share over the long haul, which should help the greenback. As such, while a modestly strong dollar over the remainder of the year will be a headwind for oil, it may not be a strong enough impediment to prevent Brent from rising another $6/bbl to reach $80/bbl, as per our commodity team's projections. Chart 13U.S. Oil Imports ##br##Have Collapsed Chart 14Slowing Global Growth Tends##br## To Be Bullish For The Dollar The Outlook For Equities Following the script of the late 1990s, stock market volatility has risen this year, as investors have begun to fret about the durability of the nine year-old equity bull market. Valuations are not as extreme as they were in 2000, but they are far from cheap. The Shiller P/E for U.S. stocks stands at 31, consistent with total nominal returns of only 4% over the next decade (Chart 15). On a price-to-sales basis, U.S. stocks have surpassed their 2000 peak (Chart 16). Such a rich multiple to sales can be justified if profit margins stay elevated, but that is far from a sure thing. Yes, the composition of the stock market has shifted towards sectors such as technology, which have traditionally enjoyed high margins. The explosion of winner-take-all markets has also allowed the most successful companies to dominate the stock market indices, while second-tier companies get pushed to the sidelines (Chart 17). Chart 15Long-Term Investors, Take Note Chart 16U.S. Stocks Are Pricey Chart 17Only The Best Nevertheless, there continues to be a strong relationship between economy-wide profits and the ratio of selling prices-to-unit labor costs (Chart 18). The latest data suggest that U.S. wage growth has picked up in the first quarter (Table 2). Low-skilled workers, whose wages tend to be better correlated with economic slack than those of high-skilled workers, are finally seeing sizable gains. Chart 18U.S. Profit Margins Could Resume Mean-Reverting... Table 2...If Wage Growth Continues Accelerating Even if productivity growth accelerates, unit labor costs are likely to rise faster than prices, pushing profit margins for many companies lower. Bottom-up analysts expect annual EPS growth to average more than 15% over the next five years, a level of optimism not seen since 1998 (Chart 19). The bar for positive surprises on the earnings front is getting increasingly high. Go For Value Historically, stocks tend not to peak until about six months before the start of a recession. Given our expectation that the next recession will occur in 2020, global equities could still enjoy a blow-off rally after the current shakeout exhausts itself. But when the music stops, the stock market is heading for a mighty fall. Given today's lofty valuations and the uncertainty about the precise timing of the next recession, we would certainly not fault long-term investors for taking some money off the table. For those who feel compelled to stay fully invested, our advice is to shift allocations towards cheaper alternatives. Value stocks have massively underperformed growth stocks for the past 11 years (Chart 20). Today, value trades at a greater-than-normal discount to growth. Earnings revisions are moving in favor of value names. Just like at the turn of the millennium, it may be value's turn to shine. Chart 19The Bar For Positive Earnings Surprises Has Risen Chart 20Value Stocks: An Attractive Proposition Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For more information about our Investment Conference, please click here or contact your account manager. 2 Edward E. Leamer, "Housing Is The Business Cycle," Proceedings, Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, (2007). 3 To arrive at this number, we multiply the current exchange rate by the degree to which EUR/USD would have to strengthen, on average, every year for the next 30 years in order to nullify the carry advantage of holding Treasurys over bunds. Thus, 1.217*(1.0192)^30=2.15. Granted, investors expect inflation to be about 45 bps lower in the euro area than in the U.S. over the next three decades. However, this would only lift the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) value of EUR/USD from its current level of 1.32 to 1.51. This would still leave the euro 42% overvalued. 4 Please see Global ETF Strategy Special Report, "Do ETF Flows Lead Currencies?" dated April 18, 2018. 5 When a foreign investor buys U.S. bonds currency-hedged, this entails two transactions. First, the investor must purchase the bond, and second, the investor must sell the dollar forward (which is similar to shorting it). The former transaction increases the demand for dollars, while the latter increases the supply of dollars. Thus, as far as the value of the dollar is concerned, it is a wash. In contrast, if foreign investors buy bonds currency-unhedged, there is no offsetting increase in the supply of dollars, and hence the dollar will tend to strengthen. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Chart of the WeekCrude Oil Prices Align With##BR##Supply-Demand Fundamentals Hedge funds are backing up the truck to get long oil in their portfolios, putting on record or near-record positions in everything from crude oil to gasoline, as global markets tighten and OPEC 2.0 leaders hint they are comfortable with prices that are higher for longer.1 When speculators significantly increase their positions in the market - on the long or the short side - market participants, policymakers and the general public typically begin to wonder whether prices are being artificially distorted by this activity. Our research into the effects of speculation in oil markets is not raising alarm bells at present. If anything, our fundamental models indicate prices are clearing the market in line with supply, demand and inventories (Chart of the Week). We remain overweight oil, and would use sell-offs to add to existing length, including energy-heavy commodity index exposure. Energy: Overweight. Oil markets remain on edge ahead of the May 12 deadline for U.S. President Trump to extend waivers on Iranian export sanctions. If waivers are extended, markets could sell off. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum prices fell ~ 10% earlier in the week on news the U.S. would extend the period during which American customers of Rusal had to comply with sanctions against Oleg Deripaska, the company's principal shareholder. U.S. officials also suggested they would lift the sanctions if Deripaska relinquished control over Rusal. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our tactical long position in spot silver established a week ago is down 3.1%, along with gold. A stronger USD weighed on both markets. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese importers of U.S. sorghum petitioned their government to waive the 179% deposit required by Chinese customs for cargoes on the water, according to Reuters.2 The news service also reported soybean trade between the U.S. and China has ground to a halt. Feature Hedge funds are taking their oil exposure to record or near-record highs in crude oil and refined products markets. A tally of positioning by Reuters to the week ended April 20, 2018, shows specs took net oil and products positions to 1.41 billion barrels across CME Group's crude and products futures markets and those of the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) (Chart 2).3 The reasons cited for the marked increase in speculative positioning in the oil markets have featured in our research since OPEC 2.0's formation in November 2016. These include: Restraint and erosion on the supply side. Production discipline by OPEC and non-OPEC producers has limited supply growth (Chart 3): We estimate crude oil production this year at 99.70mm b/d vs. our March estimate of 100.20mm b/d. Accelerated deterioration of Venezuelan supply has helped constrain global production growth; Chart 2Spec Open Interest Surges Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Discipline Restrains Supply Continued expansion of global demand (Chart 4). In our modeling, consumption growth for this year will be 1.70mm b/d, bringing demand to 100.30mm b/d in 2018. We expect growth for next year of 1.70mm b/d, which will take consumption to 102.00mm b/d; Together, these major fundamental drivers have combined to drain OECD commercial inventories by 395mm barrels from their peak of 3.1 billion barrels in July, 2016 (Chart 5). Chart 4Global Growth Supports Demand Chart 5OECD Inventories Will Continue Drawing As we noted last week, our price forecasts for Brent and WTI crude oil are unchanged at $74 and $70/bbl this year, and $67 and $64/bbl, respectively, next year. We expect OPEC 2.0 to provide forward guidance on its production for 2019, after member states agree on an organizational structure that institutionalizes it as a permanent production-management coalition. As we cautioned last week, this likely will cause us to revise our price forecast for 2019 upward.4 Measuring Speculative Influence In Oil Markets Oil speculators occupy a unique place in the academic literature, and the public's imagination. In the literature, academics largely see them either as bit players in the evolution of oil prices, or as traders who, by their activity, push price to levels far beyond anything justified by the fundamentals, particularly when commodity prices are rising.5 When that commodity is crude oil, and its chief refined product, gasoline - commodities with highly visible prices consumers can track continuously - everyone has an opinion. Not unsurprisingly, the media and politicians join this chorus of recrimination in rising markets, and vilify speculators as well.6 This is hardly surprising. Speculative influence over commodity prices - and the motives of speculators - has been debated for centuries.7 Chart 6Speculative Intensity (Working's T) Vs. Price In the modern era, Holbrook Working, the great Stanford ag economist, developed a speculative intensity index in 1960 to measure the effect of commodity market speculation.8 Working's T Index shows how much speculative positioning exceeds the net demand for hedging from commercial participants in the market.9 Excessive speculation - spec positioning in excess of hedging demand by commercial interests - could be read into index values above 1.0. However, the U.S. CFTC notes values of Working's T at or below 1.15 do not provide sufficient liquidity to support hedging, even though "there is an excess of speculation, technically speaking."10 We plotted Working's T for Brent and WTI futures, and find speculative positioning has ranged between 1.10 and 1.60 (Chart 6). Speculative intensity was trending upward from 2000 - 2014, and then trended lower. Since January 2018, it has averaged 1.4. We would note this latter period encompasses the OPEC market-share war launched in November 2014, and the formation of OPEC 2.0 in November 2016. This was an especially difficult market for hedge funds and speculators generally, particularly last year, when many funds were forced to shutter their operations. Over the past three years, markets have had to adjust to a production free-for-all arising from OPEC's market-share war, which was followed by a supply shock induced by OPEC 2.0, when it agreed to remove 1.80mm b/d of oil production from the market.11 Given this backdrop, it is not surprising to see speculative intensity in oil markets falling, as our chart indicates. Specs And Prices Our research shows the evolution of oil prices is dominated by fundamentals - supply, demand, inventory and broad trade-weighted USD being the dominant fundamentals - and not by spec positioning.12 In forthcoming research, we will dig deeper into this, and also look at the evolution of price volatility in the oil markets. Our analysis using Working's T indicates speculators provide sufficient liquidity to hedgers in the Brent and WTI futures markets, suggesting they are fulfilling the role posited by the IEA in its 2012 medium-term analysis: "Speculators should not be viewed as adversarial agents. Rather, they are essential participants for the proper functioning of commodity derivatives markets by providing the necessary liquidity, thereby reducing market volatility."13 Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC/non-OPEC producer coalition lead by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which pledged to remove 1.80mm b/d of production from the market. 2 Please see "China's sorghum importers ask government to drop tariff for cargoes en route," published by uk.reuters.com April 24, 2018, and "After sorghum spat, U.S. - China trade fears halt soybean imports," published April 25, 2018. 3 Please see "Commentary: Hedge fund oil bulls on the rampage as bears vanish," published by uk.reuters.com on April 23, 2018. 4 For our most recent assessment of supply-demand fundamentals, please see "Tighter Balances Make Oil Price Excursions To $80/bbl Likely," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy April 19, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Bookending this research are Hamilton, James D. (2009), "Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007 - 08," published by the Brookings Institution re fundamentals dominating the evolution of oil prices, and, at the other end, Singleton, Kenneth (2011), "Investor Flows and the 2008 Boom/Bust in Oil Prices," available at SSRN. 6 Please see the International Energy Agency's "Oil: Medium-Term Market Report 2012," for a discussion on speculation beginning on p. 21. 7 See, for example, the discussion of how Thales of Miletus in modern-day Turkey monopolized the olive-press market, and how another unnamed individual in Sicily cornered the iron market, in the Politics of Aristotle, a Greek philosopher of the 4th century BCE (at 1259a in Politics). 8 Working was a pioneer in the analysis of prices and agricultural trading markets. Please see Working, Holbrook (1960), "Speculation on Hedging Markets," Stanford University Food Research Institute Studies 1: 185-220. 9 We use the specification of Working's T found in Adjemian, M. K., V. G. Bruno, M. A. Robe, and J. Wallen. "What Drives Volatility Expectations in Grain Markets?" Proceedings of the NCCC-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management (pp. 18, 19). Working's T is calculated as with SS = Speculative Short Open Interest, SL = Speculative Long Open Interest, HL = Hedge Long Open Interest, and HS = Hedge Short Open Interest. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) notes, "Working's T-index is silent on the direction of speculation (long versus short). Instead, the amount of speculation is gauged relative to what is needed to balance hedging positions. Because it is directionless Working's T-index is only tested as a causal variable for market volatility." Please see Irwin, S. H. and D. R. Sanders (2010), "The Impact of Index and Swap Funds on Commodity Futures Markets: Preliminary Results", OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, No. 27. 10 Please see Irwin and Sanders (2010), p. 5. 11 We discuss the extremely difficult trading environment confronted by hedge funds and others over the past two years in our Special Report titled "Key Themes For Energy Markets in 2018," which was published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy December 7, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 12 Granger-causality tests on Brent and WTI prices between 2010 and now - the post-GFC era - show the level of prices leads spec position levels in these markets. 13 Please see (p. 22) of the IEA's 2012 Medium-term Market Report cited above. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017